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REFERENCES,  CONVENTIONS AND MEASURES 
 
Normally, much of the materials in a monograph would be one’s own. This book, 
however, is a work in which I try to let Tocqueville speak to us in his own words.  
Consequently it is a patchwork of quotations with a concomitant effect on style. 
On the other hand I hope that the authenticity of the chosen authors will enrich 
the argument.  
 
Spelling has not been modernized. American spelling (e.g. labor for labour) has 
usually been changed to the English variant. Italics in quotations are in the 
original, unless otherwise indicated. Variant spellings in quotations have not 
been corrected. 
 
Round brackets in quotations are those of the original author; my interpolations 
are in square brackets. In the quotations from Adam Smith, where angled 
brackets have been used by modern editors to show where words or letters have 
been added, I have reproduced these. Square brackets are used for my 
interpolations or expansions.  
 
The footnote references give an abbreviated title and page number. The usual 
form is author, short title, volume number if there is one (in upper case Roman 
numerals), page number(s). The full title of the work referred to is given in the 
bibliography at the end of the book, where there is also a list of common 
abbreviations used in the footnotes. 
 
Where several quotations within a single paragraph are taken from the same 
author, the references are given after the last of the quotations. Each page 
reference is given, even if it is a repeated page number.  
 
Measures 
 
A number of the quotations refer to English systems of measurement, some of 
which are now no longer in use. 
 
Value: four farthings to a penny, twelve pennies (d) to a shilling (s), twenty 
shillings to a pound (£). One pound in the seventeenth century was worth about 
40 times its present value (in 1997). 
 
Weight: sixteen ounces to a pound, fourteen pounds to a stone, eight stone to 
hundred-weight (cwt) and twenty hundred-weight to a ton. (approx one pound 
(lb) equals 0.454 kg.) 
 
Liquid volume: two pints to a quart, four quarts to a gallon. (approx one and 
three quarter pints to one litre) 
 
Distance: twelve inches to a foot, three feet to a yard, 1760 yards to a mile. 
(approx 39.4 inches to 1 metre). 
 
Area: an acre.  (approx 2.47 acres to a hectare).  
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PREFACE 
 
My book The Riddle of the Modern World; Of Liberty, Wealth and Equality was 
published by Macmillan in 2000. It discussed the work of four major writers 
who had dedicated their lives to trying to answer the riddle of how our modern 
world originated and what its future might be. These were the Baron de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), Adam Smith (1723-90), Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-
59) and Ernest Gellner (1920-95). 
 
   The book was modestly successful and went into paperback. Yet, by combining 
these thinkers, the distinctive contribution of each one may have been somewhat 
muffled. This long and quite expensive book did not reach a wider audience who 
might be potentially interested in one or two of the authors treated, but not all of 
them at once.  
 
   So I have decided to re-issue each part as a downloadable electronic book, and 
add others parts of my exploration of the riddle of modernity in due course, 
including the assessment of a number of other key thinkers such as F.W. 
Maitland and Yukichi Fukuzawa.  
 
   Apart from correcting a few minor errors I have not otherwise altered the text. 
Since I wrote the original chapters some ten years ago, there has been further 
work on the problems which Montesquieu and the other thinkers I have written 
about addressed. To have incorporated this more recent work would have 
created a different book. I hope one day to consider this new work in a wider 
appraisal of not only Montesquieu but of my whole attempt to pursue the ‘riddle 
of the world’, which will also incorporate the final synthetic chapter to The 
Riddle of the Modern World, ‘The Riddle Resolved?’, which is omitted here.   
 
   I subsequently lectured on Montesquieu and other thinks for second year 
students at Cambridge University. The filmed lecture can be seen at: 
 
http://www.alanmacfarlane.com/theorists/montesquieu.htm 
 
   I present my assessment of Montesquieu’s contribution to the wide questions 
concerning the origins, nature and future of human civilization with no further 
introduction since I believe that his brilliant speculations stand on their own 
merits. It is obvious what problems he is addressing and many of his insights are 
still relevant today. 
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1. MONTESQUIEU’S LIFE AND VISION 
 
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède and Montesquieu was born at the 
chateau of La Brède, near Bordeaux, on 18 January 1689. His ancestors were 
soldiers and magistrates and he himself trained to be a lawyer. He was educated 
at the College of the Oratorians near Paris from the age of 11 and at 16 returned 
to the University of Bordeaux to continue his study of law. In 1708, at age 19, he 
was admitted to the bar as an avocat au Parlement. Further studies in Paris, 
probably as a law clerk, between 1709-1713 took place before his father’s death in 
1713 (his mother had died in 1696). He married Jeanne Lartigue in 1715 and in 
1716 his uncle died so he took the name Montesquieu formally and became 
président à mortier at Bordeaux. In 1721 his Les Lettres Persanes were 
published anonymously in Holland and were a great success; he became a 
member of various salons in Paris. In 1726 he sold his office of president in 
Bordeaux and in effect retired from legal life. 
 
   During the years 1728-1731 he travelled to Hungary, Italy, Austria, Germany 
and England, spending much the longest period in England. In 1734 Les 
Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur 
décadences was published in Holland. In 1735, aged 46, he explicitly began his 
work on The Spirit of the Laws which would fill the rest of his life. In 1748, 
some thirteen years later, the Spirit was published in Geneva, again 
anonymously. In 1752 the book was placed on the Catholic Church’s Index of 
Forbidden Books. Montesquieu died in Paris on 10 February 1755, aged 66. 
 
   In considering the context of his work, one powerful influence was a tension 
between the estate-owning aristocrat and the world of commerce. Not only was 
his mother ‘shrewd in business’, but Montesquieu’s upbringing on the edge of 
the great international port of Bordeaux gave him an acquaintance with the 
world of trade and manufacture. Bordeaux was ‘unusually cosmopolitan because 
the wine trade brought a lot of foreign businessmen to the city.’1 It was for 
Montesquieu what Glasgow was to be for Adam Smith, a potent reminder of a 
wider, international, world, and in both cases the orientation was towards the 
west - to the expanding wealth of the Americas. Althusser captures some of this 
when he writes that Montesquieu’s breadth of vision, his attempt to write a work 
that took as its object ‘the entire history of all the men who have ever lived’, was 
related to a revolution in the knowledge of the world which was occurring as a 
result of explorations in the ages succeeding Columbus. Bordeaux was perfectly 
placed to receive news of these distant lands. ‘It is the age of the discovery of the 
Earth, of the great explorations opening up to Europe the knowledge and the 
exploitation of the Indies East and West and of Africa. Travellers brought back 
in their coffers spices and gold, and in their memories the tales of customs and 
institutions which overthrew all the received truths.’2 This had laid the founda-
tions for Montaigne’s great relativist speculations. Two centuries on, 
Montesquieu had even richer data to draw on, for the new knowledge of India 
and particularly China and Japan was beginning to flow in as the great trading 
networks expanded over the world. 
                                                
    1Shklar, Montesquieu, 3 
    2Althusser, Montesquieu, 18-19 
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   Not only did his position thrust a new knowledge upon him, but it brought 
home to him the power of commerce. We shall see that one of his major 
contributions was partly to overcome the normal aristocratic antipathy to 
business and production. His influence of his mother, of running the La Brède 
estate, and of commercial Bordeaux helped create that interest and insight. 
 
   The tensions of his upbringing and background in Gascony were made all the 
stronger by his life’s experience. One of the most important of these was the 
changing political and social world of France over his lifetime. Montesquieu was 
born and brought up in the shadow of Louis XIV, probably the greatest of the 
absolutist rulers in European history, who had reigned for seventy-two years 
from 1643 to 1715. Thus Montesquieu was already 26 when Louis died. Louis’ 
avowed aim was to spread his rule over the whole of Europe. Thus Montesquieu 
saw the immense strength of the most powerful state of Europe all round him 
and he himself, as a judge who put people to the torture, was an instrument of 
that power. Parallel and equally obvious was the power of the Roman Catholic 
Church, with its inquisition and censor. That Montesquieu had to publish his 
three major works outside France, and two of them anonymously, is just one 
indication of the twin threats to liberty. 
 
   Thus he grew up in the classic hierarchical, all-encompassing, world of the 
ancien regime where politics and religion were joined and control was 
paramount. And then, to provide the shock of contrast, of another possibility, 
two things happened. The first was the death of Louis XIV which liberated 
France. The change is well described by Sorel, and Saint-Simon whom he 
quotes. 
 
Louis XIV had just departed. His declining years resembled a gloomy and majestic sunset. 
Contemporaries did not stop to admire the twilight of a great reign; they were glad to be set 
free. No one regretted the king; he had too strictly imposed on all Frenchmen ‘that 
dependence which subjected all.’ ‘The provinces,’ says Saint-Simon, ‘rallying from despair at 
their ruin and annihilation, breathed free and trembled for joy. The higher courts and the 
whole magisterial caste had been reduced to insignificance by edicts and appeals; now the 
former hoped to make a figure, the latter to be exempt from royal intermeddling. The people, 
ruined, crushed, and desperate, thanked Heaven with scandalous openness for a deliverance 
touching the reality of which their eagerness admitted no doubts.’1 
 
There followed a period of relative freedom, excitement and openness. 
Montesquieu was exhilarated and the Lettres Persanes published six years 
later were a product of this more liberal and open world. Yet it was, within 
France, only a relative liberation. Those very letters had to be published in 
Holland and the French censor never formally allowed their entry to France. The 
power of the Catholic Church was little diminished. France was still a modified 
ancien regime. Montesquieu could read about alternative, more open, systems 
and his interest in early Greek and particularly Roman civilization gave him 
models. Yet what he needed in order to prove that an alternative, open, world 
was indeed possible, was a large scale living example. This example was 
provided by his visit to England. 
 
                                                
    1Sorel, Montesquieu, 30 
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   Montesquieu arrived in England on 23rd October 1729. He stayed for nearly 
two years and closely studied the political and social system. When he arrived, 
he wrote, ‘I am here in a country which hardly resembles the rest of Europe.’1 
The English were a ‘free people’, as opposed to other nations ‘this nation is 
passionately fond of liberty’, ‘every individual is independent’, ‘with regard to 
religion, as in this state every subject has a free will, and must consequently 
be...conducted by the light of his own mind...by which means the number of 
sects is increased.’2 Summarizing the interconnections he suggested that the 
English  have ‘progressed the farthest of all peoples of the world in three 
important things: in piety, in commerce, and in freedom.’3 
 
   Montesquieu himself summarized his debt to the various countries which he 
visited; Germany was made to travel in, Italy to sojourn in, France to live in, and 
England to think in.4 As Collins puts it in his useful description of Montesquieu’s 
visit to England, the trip  
 
transformed the author of the Persian Letters and of the Temple de Gnide into the 
author of the Considérations sur la Grandeur et Décadence des Romains and of the 
Esprit des Lois. The study of our constitution, of our politics, of our laws, of our temper and 
idiosyncrasies, of our social system, of our customs, manners, and habits, furnished him with 
material which was indispensable to the production of his great work.5 
 
   Montesquieu found many faults with England which are revealed in the few 
scraps that remain from his time there. For instance, in relation to religion, he 
thought the English had gone too far. ‘“There is,” he writes in his  Notes, “no 
religion in England; in the Houses of Parliament prayers are never attended by 
more than four or five members, except on great occasions. If one speaks of 
religion, every one laughs.” The very phrase “an article of faith” provokes 
ridicule.’ Referring to the committee which had recently been appointed to 
inquire into the state of religion, he says that it was regarded with contempt. In 
France he himself passed as having too little religion, in England as having too 
much; and yet, he grimly adds, “there is no nation that has more need of religion 
than the English, for those who are not afraid to hang themselves ought to be 
afraid of being damned.”‘6 Likewise, he found it a very lonely, isolated, place, the 
people cold and unfriendly. ‘When I am in France I make friends with everyone; 
in England I make friends with no one.’7 
 
   Yet it was an excellent place to think in, or even, as a kind of living model, to 
think with. He could use this experience and his many discussions and reading 
to construct an alternative to the ancien régime. Here was something old, 
continuous, yet very new. A powerful, commercial, tolerant nation that 
challenged all his own assumptions. It provided the actual, worked, example of a 
                                                
    1Tocqueville, Ancien, 89 
    2Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 307, 309, 308, 312 
    3Quoted in Weber, Protestant, 45 
    4Cited in Collins, Montesquieu, 178 
    5Collins, Montesquieu, 178 
    6Collins, Montesquieu, 143; Montesquieu made a distinction between ‘piety’ and ‘religion’, which alone explains his apparently 
contradictory statements.  
    7Collins, Montesquieu, 138 
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system that could stand up against despotism. He realized its weaknesses, but he 
also saw its growing strength, both as a practice and an ideal. As Collins puts it,  
 
It was here that he saw illustrated, as it were in epitome and with all the emphasis of glaring 
contrast, the virtues, the vices, the potentialities of good, the potentialities of evil, inherent in 
monarchy, in aristocracy, in the power of the people. It was here that he perceived and 
understood what liberty meant, intellectually, morally, politically, socially. He saw it in its 
ugliness, he saw it in its beauty.1  
 
England was a place to think in, so both there and when he returned to France 
with this model before him, ‘Patiently, soberly, without prejudice, without heat, 
he investigated, analysed, sifted, balanced; and on the conclusions that he drew 
were founded most of the generalisations which have made him immortal.’2 ‘It 
was in England that the ideas to be developed in both these masterpieces 
[Considérations and Spirit of the Laws] took a definite form, in England 
that they found stimulus and inspiration, from England that they drew 
nutriment.’3  
 
   Montesquieu had now the two experiences that seem to be necessary for deep 
analysis of the foundations of a civilization. On the one hand there is the 
personal knowledge of a rapid and dramatic change within one’s own country 
and environment: this was provided by the pre and post Louis XIV world. The 
second was the shock of placing one’s own society and its assumptions against 
those of another - in this case ancien régime France against the strangely 
different England.     
 
 *    
 
   In attempting to understand himself, to understand a changing France, to 
make sense of the broad topics which he wished to study, Montesquieu had to 
come to terms with a number of theoretical problems which have continued to 
face the social sciences. The central problem concerns the nature of cause and 
effect, within which we can include single and multiple causation, general and 
particular causes and the nature of change through time. This was an area that 
he found so important, yet difficult, that among his unpublished archives is an 
Essai sur les causes, which was written ‘to clarify one of his most difficult 
problems, that of the relationship between physical and moral causes.’4  
 
   It seems that Montesquieu, like any true historian faced with the evidence, was 
ambivalent and contradictory on the question of chance and necessity. On the 
one hand he recognized that apparently accidental and random small events 
could have immense consequences and change the course of history. Thus in his 
Pensées he wrote ‘all these great movements only happened because of some 
unplanned, unforeseen action. Lucrecia’s death caused Tarquin’s fall. Brutus’s 
act of executing his sons established liberty. Seeing Virginia slain by her father 
                                                
    1Collins, Montesquieu, 178 
    2Collins, Montesquieu, 178-9 
    3Collins, Montesquieu, 181; for a more recent and detailed account of his English visit, see Shackleton, Montesquieu, Ch.vi. 
    4Shackleton, Montesquieu, 231 
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caused the fall of the Ten.’1 These are small, personal, almost accidental events, 
yet ‘From the public’s unsuspected and therefore unpredictable reaction flows a 
new social order.’2 
 
   On the other hand, he is much better known for his view that history is mainly 
governed by general causes, in which individual humans are just epiphenomena. 
One example also occurs in his Pensées. He distinguishes between the general 
causes which were bound to lead to a Reformation, and the accident of Martin 
Luther. ‘Martin Luther is credited with the Reformation. But it had to happen. If 
it had not been Luther, it would have been someone else. The arts and sciences 
coming from Greece had already opened eyes to abuses. Such a cause had to 
produce some effect. A proof of this: the councils of Constance and Basel had 
introduced a kind of reformation.’3  In a similar way he wrote, ‘It was not the 
affair of Pultowa that ruined Charles. Had he not been destroyed at that place, 
he would have been in another. The casualties of fortune are easily repaired; but 
who can be guarded against events that incessantly arise from the nature of 
things?’4 A more famous example comes in his account of the rise and decline of 
the Roman Empire. 
 
It is not chance that rules the world. Ask the Romans, who had a continuous sequence of 
successes when they were guided by a certain plan, and an uninterrupted sequence of reverses 
when they followed another. There are general causes, moral and physical, which act in every 
monarchy, elevating it, maintaining it, or hurling it to the ground. All accidents are controlled 
by these causes. And if the chance of one battle - that is, a particular cause - has brought a 
state to ruin, some general cause made it necessary for that state to perish from a single battle. 
In a word, the main trend draws with it all particular accidents.5  
 
Towards the end of this passage he almost brings the two together. A single 
battle may topple a state, it is the proximate cause, but it only acts in this way as 
a result of deeper background causes. His whole discussion of this matter, as 
Shackleton shows, was related to the work of contemporaries, in particular Vico 
and Doria. In fact the first half of the passage above is directly inspired by La 
Vita Civile by Doria.6 As Shackleton says, this is not to disparage  Montesquieu 
who carried into history ‘the distinction between the First Cause and occasional 
causes.’7 
 
   Montesquieu’s ultimate aim was to understand the cause or causes of things; 
why some societies suffered from despotism, why northern Europe was growing 
richer, why the world’s population seemed to have declined and why the Roman 
Empire had collapsed. Like all historians, his views changed over time, and he 
swung from being an almost naive geographical and climatic determinist, as 
                                                
    1Quoted in Conroy, Montesquieu, 126 
    2Conroy, Montesquieu, 126 
    3Conroy, Montesquieu, 127 
    4Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 142 
    5Montesquieu, Considerations, 169 
    6Shackleton, Montesquieu, 168 
    7Shackleton, Montesquieu, 169; there are other particularly interesting discussions of Montesquieu’s theories of causation in Sorel, 
Montesquieu, 205-7 and Durkheim, Montesquieu, 44-47 
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Collingwood thought him to be1, to being an almost idealist thinker who believed 
that moral and intellectual causes swayed history. His thought is a bundle of 
contradictions.2 
 
   If we look at all of his work, we see that he ends up with a balanced approach to 
causation. The ‘spirit of the laws’ as constituted by a number of inter-acting 
causes, physical and moral, is well summarized in  a passage from  Montesquieu 
quoted Sorel. The spirit of a people’s law 
 
must have relations to the physical characteristics of a country, to the climate, - frigid, torrid, 
or temperate, - to the nature of the land, its situation, its extent, to the people’s mode of 
life;...they must have relations to the degree of liberty that the constitution can admit of; to the 
religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, 
their morals, their manners. Finally, they have relations one to another, to their origin, to the 
aim of the legislator, to the order of things under which they were established. They must be 
considered from all these points of view, and I undertake so to consider them in this work. I 
shall examine all these relations; together they form what I have called the Spirit of the 
Laws.3  
 
This is an excellent brief outline for the social sciences and it does not show any 
kind of naive physical or moral determinism. In seeking such a balance,  
Montesquieu was a true ancestor of Durkheim, Weber and twentieth century 
anthropology, even if, in practice, his book, written in fits and starts, occa-
sionally, falls away from this balanced view. 
 
   Montesquieu’s attitude towards time and progress is complex and this is 
reflected in an apparent disagreement among those who have commented on his 
theories. On the one hand a number of authors have argued that he had little 
sense of historical change and cumulative progress. For example, J.B.Bury in his 
study of The Idea of Progress states that ‘Montesquieu was not among the 
apostles of the idea of Progress. It never secured any hold upon his mind.’ He 
finds this odd, for ‘he had grown up in the same intellectual climate in which 
that idea was produced.’ Yet he failed to grasp it. ‘Whatever be the value of the 
idea of Progress, we may agree with Comte that, if Montesquieu had grasped it, 
he would have produced a more striking work.’4 Richter writes that 
‘Montesquieu did not believe in the theory of progress; his philosophy of history 
has been described as “pessimism in moderation”.’5 Likewise Shklar states that 
‘He did not believe in cumulative progress, and his sense of the most recent past 
was one of radical discontinuity rather than continuous development. It seemed 
to him that the expansion of Europe after the discovery of America had made it 
so wealthy and powerful that it was wholly unlike anything that had ever existed 
in the past.’6 
                                                
    1Collingwood, Idea of History, 79, 97, 200 
    2 Shackleton, Montesquieu, ch. xiv and Sorel, Montesquieu, 139-40 are particularly illuminating accounts of his theory of climate 
and causation.  
    3Sorel, Montesquieu, 89 
    4Bury, Progress, 145, 148 
    5Richter, Montesquieu, 105 
    6Shklar, Montesquieu, 50; Fletcher, Montesquieu, 73 and Durkheim, Montesquieu, 57-59  argue similarly that Montesquieu had 
no sense of progressive time.  
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   On the other hand Shackleton, his noted biographer and commentator, argues 
that Montesquieu did have a sense of progressive time. In an article first 
published in 1949, Shackleton makes a detailed study of the esprit general as a 
central organizing concept in  Montesquieu’s thought. He concludes that this 
‘gives the lie...to those who deny to  Montesquieu any evolutionary sense and 
shows that he has a clear and straightforward theory of progress.’1 In his later 
biography of  Montesquieu Shackleton takes up the theme again. He shows that 
while  Montesquieu’s theory is ‘more tentative and more empirical’ than 
Turgot’s, ‘he has enunciated, not less than Turgot, a theory of progress...’2 This is 
the progress which human kind has made from a world ruled by physical causes, 
to one governed by moral and legal forces. 
 
   The two views of  Montesquieu in fact reflect two strands in his thought. He 
both believed that societies and mankind evolved, changed, grew more complex, 
altered, just as a tree grows and branches. But he also refused to believe that 
moral progress, happiness, security, freedom and all the valuable things in life 
necessarily increased. As he looked at the collapse of Rome, at the repeated 
invasions of the Mongols, at the cruelties and despotism he thought ruled much 
of the world, at the short duration of open societies, he felt no great confidence 
in the future. His was an interesting and exactly balanced mixture of a cyclical 
and linear view. He lived at the cusp of the times, just at the point when the 
world seemed about to escape from that nightmare of the ancien regime 
which he dreaded. Montesquieu stands exactly on the bridge between the 
ancien regime and something entirely unpredictable and surprising. His 
greatness lies in the fact that in his ambivalent reflections on his times he 
sensed, often only implicitly, what was just below the horizon. 
 
   Montesquieu wished to understand the whole of world history and the whole 
of his current world. The Spirit of the Laws ‘has for its object the laws, 
customs, and various usages of all peoples.’3 In order to do this he developed a 
series of methods which laid the basis for the social and historical sciences. One 
of these was his comparative methodology, which aimed to compare not only the 
different parts of Europe, but Europe with the Islamic societies of the Middle 
East and even Europe with China and Japan. In attempting this huge 
comparison, Montesquieu was fortunate for it was just at the time that a massive 
influx of new information about other civilizations began to arrive in Europe. 
The greatest account of Japanese civilization in a foreign language, Engelbert 
Kaempfer’s History of Japan, was published in three volumes in 1727  and Du 
Halde’s Empire of China, an encyclopaedic compilation of early missionary 
accounts of China, published in 1735. Montesquieu also used the collections of 
accounts of early trade missions to China. The Spirit of the Laws is thus 
notable in that it is the first great comparative survey of world civilizations. 
Montaigne had attempted something similar one and a half centuries earlier, 
also writing from near the port of Bordeaux. But Montaigne’s sources on the Far 
East were exiguous. The Chinese dimension was intellectually important for 
                                                
    1Shackleton, Essays, 37 
    2Shackleton, Montesquieu, 319 
    3Complete Works, quoted in Richter, ‘Montesquieu’, 472 
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Montesquieu because it made it possible to see the whole of Europe as a system 
or civilization with an innate dynamism in contrast to the stasis which had 
apparently overtaken China. 
 
   Durkheim believed that Montesquieu’s implicit use of the comparative method 
was a central feature of his work.1 Richter suggests that Montesquieu was 
somewhat more explicitly aware of what he was doing, citing him to suggest that 
‘Comparison, the single most valuable capacity of the human mind, is 
particularly useful when applied to human collectivities.’2 Thus he believes that 
Montesquieu ‘made comparison the central problem of political sociology and 
thus directed the forms of inquiry away from Europe to all the societies known, 
however imperfectly, to man.’3 This is a task which is fundamental to 
anthropology as well. It also has the effect of putting one’s own society into 
doubt: ‘Montesquieu argued that we can understand political and social 
phenomena only when we can stipulate some arrangement alternative to that in 
question.’4 
 
   Yet in order to compare across societies one has to engage in a form of 
classificatory activity which is both difficult and unusual. This led Montesquieu 
into a second methodological innovation. He is widely credited with introducing 
‘ideal type’ analysis, that is the setting up of simplified models against which 
reality can be tested, benchmarks so to speak. For instance he set up such 
models of the three forms of political organization, republics, monarchies and 
despotism. This had been foreshadowed by Aristotle and Machiavelli and others, 
but Montesquieu took the analysis much further by showing not only the forms, 
but by analysing the socio-geographical conditions within which each of them 
occurred. He is well aware that actual cases do not correspond to the ideal-type, 
thus there are frequent references to the fact that England as a place may not 
conform to the ‘ideal-type’ England he has created, and likewise Chinese 
despotism in practice is not like Chinese despotism in its theoretical 
construction. Each European nation had deviated from his ideal-type picture of 
monarchy. What the ideal types did, however, was to allow Montesquieu, and 
later Weber and others, to engage in fruitful comparative research.5 
 
   Although he did not believe in teleological evolution or inevitable progress 
towards a predestined goal, Montesquieu was both interested and well versed in 
history. There are several strands to his work which are historical and two can be 
mentioned here. One is his historical interest in Roman civilization, shown both 
in his Considerations and in a number of chapters of Spirit. Although his 
treatment of Rome has been criticized, what Roman history allowed 
Montesquieu to do was to watch the process of historical change over a long 
period, to see the whole of a civilization’s growth, greatness and decay and to 
analyse the reasons for the latter. The central message was that all civilizations 
contain within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. Rome collapsed 
                                                
    1Durkheim, Montesquieu, 50-1 
    2Richter ‘Montesquieu’,  472 
    3 Richter, ‘Montesquieu’, 475 
    4Richter, Montesquieu, 73 
    5 The importance of his achievement is again well summarized by Durkheim, Montesquieu, 62.  
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through internal corruption, and particularly because the balance of power at 
the centre became skewed. A model of how this had happened and would 
happen to all successful Empires was of great use to Montesquieu. 
 
   His second interest was in the origins of modern France, which took him into 
many years of work on the historical sources for the Dark Ages. He wrote at 
length on the early foundations of liberty in the customs of the peoples who 
swept across Europe at the collapse of Roman civilization, and then traced the 
early stages of the evolution of feudalism in Europe. His curiosity ‘attracted him 
towards those mysterious forests whence issued along with the Germans, his 
alleged ancestors, the elements of political liberty.’ This research was lengthy 
and laborious.’ ‘His toil was severe, his investigations slow and painful. “ I 
seem,” he remarked, “all at sea, and in a shoreless sea. All these cold, dry, 
tasteless, and difficult writings must be read, must be devoured...”‘1 But it was 
true historical research and certainly imbued  with an idea of difference and 
change over time. It was not all on one flat, a-synchronous, level, plain.  
 
   A third important part of his vision is what we might term a ‘structural’ or 
‘relational’ approach to history and society.   In the Persian Letters, 
Montesquieu foreshadowed a structural definition of his central concept, laws, 
when he wrote ‘Justice is a true relation existing between two things; a relation 
which is always the same, whoever contemplates it, whether it be God, or an 
angel, or lastly, man himself.’2 Thus justice does not lie in a thing, but in a 
relation between things: perhaps this is why ‘chose’ comes up so much in his 
conversation. He was talking of those ‘relations of relations’ which is at the heart 
of structural thinking. The very first sentence of The Spirit of the Laws, the 
key definition, which has puzzled and often upset so many readers, proclaims 
this same structural approach. ‘Laws, in their most general signification, are the 
necessary relations arising from the nature of things. In this sense all beings 
have their laws: the Deity His laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences 
superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws.’3 Notice here that 
‘relations’ cover all aspects of life. Everything is relational. In case the reader has 
not grasped the point, he re-iterates two paragraphs on that ‘laws are the 
relations subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to 
one another.’4 ‘It’ in this case is the intelligence or reasoning power of human 
beings.  
 
   As Sorel noted, this is a very general, almost mathematical, concept. 
Montesquieu ‘rightly intimates that this definition is very wide. It is so wide that 
it eludes analysis and reaches out toward infinity. It is an algebraic formula, 
applying to all real quantities and expressing none of them exactly. It is 
rigorously true of mathematical and natural laws; its application to political and 
civil laws is only remote and rather indistinct.’5 As Durkheim noted, ‘he informs 
                                                
    1Sorel, Montesquieu, 155 
    2Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no. 84 
    3Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 1 
    4Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 1 
    5 Sorel, Montesquieu, 86-7 
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the reader that he intends to deal with social science in an almost mathematical 
way.’1  
 
   It greatly puzzled many, especially lawyers, that Montesquieu should start with 
such an unusual, novel and abstract definition. If, however, we consider the later 
development of structural thinking, particularly in the French tradition through 
Durkheim and Mauss, De Saussure and through to Levi-Strauss, we can see 
what Montesquieu was doing. He was able to see the relations between power, 
wealth and belief, or politics, economics and religion, in a way which was 
hitherto impossible.  This ability to connect or relate the hitherto unconnected is 
well put by Fletcher.  
 
The supreme value of the method is that it permits the observer to see particular historical 
data in an entirely new setting, and hence to perceive relationships between things which, 
through their separation in time or space, must otherwise have remained unrelated. By 
applying the method over a sufficiently wide area of experience, and comparing similar 
‘relationships’ in whatever time or place each to each, the general ‘spirit’ governing them all 
can be revealed.2  
 
Montesquieu’s concept of social structures, of a kind of machine in which there 
are relations of parts to each other and to the whole, also feeds into the 
functionalism and structural-functionalism which came to dominate the social 
sciences between the 1880s and 1940s. This is noted by Shklar when she writes 
that for him ‘Society is a system of norms which are related to each other and 
can be understood historically and as functioning to maintain the social whole.’3 
This is straight early twentieth century functionalism.4 
 
   Most of those who have studied his writings, including the unpublished 
notebooks and his library, agree that like all scientists he mixed induction and 
deduction. An example is given by Shackleton. ‘The development of 
Montesquieu’s thoughts in relation to climate shows itself as being clearly 
inductive. Starting with an examination of the specific problem of Roman air, 
enlarging his ideas by reading, by observation, and by experiment, he arrives in 
the end at his general theory of climatic influence.’5 This is fairly characteristic, 
yet it conceals a deductive phase, as Fletcher notes.  
 
It is true that he usually starts from particular ‘facts’ and then extracts from 
them a general principle. By a sufficiently vast correlation of such ‘facts’ and of 
the particular principles which emerge from them, he is enabled by his inductive 
process to reach those very broad generalisations which he calls the ‘principles’ 
of the leading types of government. But thereafter the method becomes 
deductive. ‘When I have discovered my principles’ he says in his Preface, ‘all that 
I am searching for comes to me.’ And again: ‘I propose my principles, and I look 
to see if the particular cases fit with them.’6  
                                                
    1Durkheim, Montesquieu, 51 
    2Fletcher, Montesquieu, 74 
    3Shklar, Montesquieu, 101 
    4 The best account of how Montesquieu founded modern functionalism and structuralism is in Durkheim, Montesquieu, 56-7, 63. 
    5Shackleton, Montesquieu, 309-10 
    6Fletcher, Montesquieu, 72; my translation. 
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Montesquieu was even more explicit elsewhere; ‘You do not invent a system 
after having read history; but you begin with the system and then you seek the 
proof. There are so many facts in a long history, people have thought so 
differently, the beginnings are usually so obscure that you always find enough to 
support all kinds of reactions.’1 
 
   Durkheim echoes Montesquieu’s own assessment. Montesquieu 
 
does not begin by marshalling all the facts relevant to the subject, by setting them forth so that 
they can be examined and evaluated objectively. For the most part, he attempts by pure 
deduction to prove the idea he has already formed. He shows that it is implicit in the nature 
or, if you will, in the essence of man, society, trade, religion, in short, in the definition of the 
things in question. Only then does he set forth the facts which in his opinion confirm his 
hypothesis.2  
 
Thus  
 
If we examine Montesquieu’s own demonstrations, it is easy to see that they are essentially 
deductive. True, he usually substantiates his conclusions by observation, but this entire part of 
his argumentation is very weak. The facts he borrows from history are set forth briefly and 
summarily, and he goes to little pains to establish their veracity, even when they are 
controversial.3  
 
Thus in brief, Montesquieu ‘instead of using deduction to interpret what has 
been proved by experiment, he uses experiment to illustrate the conclusions of 
deduction.’4 
 
   Montesquieu’s vast canvas, his attempt to cover the whole of the world and the 
whole of human history, and to connect all the different aspects of life, as well as 
his primarily deductive method, led to many inaccuracies and sins of omission 
and commission which commentators have pointed to. For instance Shackleton 
summarizes some of the criticism of his accuracy and historical methods in 
relation to Roman history.5 Sorel wrote: 
 
As Montesquieu had failed to have recourse to archaeology and textual criticism in his study of 
primitive Rome, so now, in like manner, he failed to utilize anthropology in his study of primitive 
society. Why could he not have read Buffon? The ‘Seventh Epoch of Nature’ would have 
explained primitive humanity and the origin of customs to him in a very simple way.6 
 
   He could be accused of finding what he wanted to find. An example is in his 
treatment of East Asia. His account of Japan, almost exclusively stressing the 
harshness of Japanese law and punishment, gives a distorted picture of that 
civilization.7 He has read Kaempfer’s great three-volume work on Japan, and yet 
                                                
    1Pensees, quoted in Conroy, Montesquieu, 131 
    2Durkheim, Montesquieu, 52 
    3Durkheim, Montesquieu, 52 
    4Durkheim, Montesquieu, 53; see also for Durkheim’s criticisms, ibid, 54 
    5Shackleton, Montesquieu, 158 
    6Sorel, Montesquieu, 84-5 
    7Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 85,196,233-4; II, 35 
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abstracts only what is relevant to his argument. His treatment of China is 
particularly interesting. As Richter points out, Montesquieu was the first to 
make the new discoveries in China, particularly Du Halde’s compilations, 
available to a wider audience and his depiction was enormously influential. Yet it 
is distorted towards a picture of absolutist despotism.1 
 
   In fact, as a number of writers have pointed out, Montesquieu was very puzzled 
by what he read about China and confused by the contrary depictions they gave.2 
Thus his account is somewhat contradictory, trying to make sense of conflicting 
images of a despotic and a benign government, of a nation ruled by fear or by 
kindness.3 In his writing we can hear Montesquieu arguing aloud with himself. 
Should he modify his model of Asiatic despotism, originally based on the model 
provided by Machiavelli and others of the Ottoman Empire, or reject the data 
from some of his Chinese sources? In the end the model wins, though it is a little 
modified. This is, as in all of his accounts, both his strength and his weakness. 
Without the over-simplification we would not have his amazing insights into the 
structural causes for the decline of Rome, the roots of feudal systems in Europe, 
and the essence of English political institutions. But in all of these, as in his 
treatment of the Orient, we must guard against the distortions of a powerful 
mind fitting data to a pre-conceived framework. 
 
   The danger becomes particularly great as the immense scope of his 
undertaking reveals itself and tiredness, growing blindness and more and more 
data overwhelm him. ‘In my view, my work grows in proportion to my 
diminishing strength. I have however, eighteen nearly finished books and eight 
which need arranging. If I was not mad about it, I would not write a single line. 
But what sorrows me is to see the beautiful things which I could do if I had 
eyes.’4 Montesquieu questioned his own wisdom in taking on the task.  ‘I have 
laboured  for twenty years on this work, and I no longer know if I have been bold 
or if I have been rash, if I had been overwhelmed by the size of my subject or if I 
had been sustained by its majesty.’5 
 
   Montesquieu himself, quoted by Sorel, perceived the difficulty of an 
ever-expanding project and of growing weariness.  
 
So long as he worked upon the earlier books he was all joy and ardour. ‘My great work is going 
forward with giant strides,’ he wrote in 1744 to the Abbé Guasco. Then was the time when ‘all 
he sought came to him of itself.’ But little by little masses of facts accumulated at the outlets 
and blocked them up. He forces the facts. ‘Everything yields to my principles,’ he wrote 
toward the last; but he does not see ‘particular cases smoothly conforming to them,’ as 
formerly. He makes an effort, canvasses the texts, arrays analogies, heaps up, but he no longer 
welds together. He settles himself doggedly to the task; he grows fatigued. ‘I am reaching an 
advanced age; and because of the vastness of the undertaking the work recedes,’ he wrote in 
1745; and in 1747, ‘My work grows dull...I am overcome by weariness.’ The concluding books 
on feudalism exhaust him. ‘This will make three hours’ reading; but I assure you that the labor 
                                                
    1Richter, Montesquieu, 84 
    2See Shackleton, Essays, 231ff; M. Hulliung, Montesquieu, 100ff 
    3Important passages occur in Montesquieu, Spirit, I,369; I, 297; I, 304 and especially Spirit, I, 122-5 
    4 Montesquieu to President Barbon, 2 Feb., 1742, translated from Starobonski, Montesquieu, 159 
    5 Montesquieu, ‘Dossier on Esprit’, translated from Starobonski, Montesquieu, 160; Sorel, Montesquieu, 92, describes the danger 
of the ageing philosopher desperately trying to finish the great work. 
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it has cost me has whitened by hair.’ ‘This work has almost killed me,’ he wrote, after revising 
the final proofs, ‘I am going to rest; I shall labour no more.’1  
 
     In a moving unpublished passage he contemplated the end of his work and 
his life: 
 
  I had conceived the design of giving a much extended and deeper treatment in certain areas 
of this work; and have become incapable of it. My reading has weakened my eyes, and it 
seems to me that what remains to me of light is just the dawn of the day when they will close 
forever. 
   I am nearly touching the moment when I must begin and end, the moment which unveils 
and steals everything, the moment mixed with bitterness and joy, the moment when I will lose 
my very weaknesses. 
  Why do I still occupy myself with some trivial writings? I search for immortality, and it is 
within myself. Expand, my soul! Precipitate yourself into immensity! Return to the great 
Being!... 
  In the deplorable state in which I find myself it has not been possible for me to give this work 
its final touches, and I would have burned it a thousand times, if I had not thought it good to 
render oneself useful to men up to one’s very last breath... 
   Immortal God! the human species is your most worthy work. To love it, is to love you, and, 
in finishing my life, I devote this love to you.2 
 
   So what did his mighty labours, the fruits of intense concentration by a first-
class intellect over a period of over 30 years, produce? His mind moved across 
the data then available for most of the world’s civilizations and the whole wealth 
of human history in order to seek the underlying spirit of the laws, the answer to 
the riddle of man’s nature, past and future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
    1Sorel, Montesquieu, 52-3 
    2 Montesquieu, ‘Dossier on Laws’, translated from Starobonski, Montesquieu, 182 
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2. LIBERTY AND DESPOTISM 
 
   Montesquieu’s central pre-occupation was how to maintain liberty and avoid 
despotism. He was aware from his own experience that liberty was very fragile; 
Louis XIV had come close to extinguishing it, the Inquisition would do so if it 
could. Three quarters of the globe, he thought, suffered from absolutist regimes. 
Only in Europe had a certain degree of liberty arisen and been preserved. But 
even here, there was no reason why it should not be extinguished, as in the late 
history of Rome. His fears are well summarized in the following passage.  
 
Most of the European nations are still governed by the principles of morality. But if from a 
long abuse of power or the fury of conquest, despotic sway should prevail to a certain degree, 
neither morals nor climate would be able to withstand its baleful influence: and then human 
nature would be exposed, for some time at least, even in this beautiful part of the world, to the 
insults with which she has been abused in the other three.1 
 
   The ‘long abuse of power’ was a recognition of Acton’s maxim that ‘power 
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.’2  Montesquieu warned 
that the ‘human mind feels such an exquisite pleasure in the exercise of power; 
even those who are lovers of virtue are so excessively fond of themselves that 
there is no man so happy as not still to have reason to mistrust his honest 
intentions.’3 This was connected to his idea of balance. Something which started 
as good, balanced and conducive to human happiness and liberty could easily be 
perverted and swing to a dangerous extreme. For example, if there was no 
equality between people, democracy was impossible. But if things swung too far 
the other way,  he saw as great a danger. ‘The principle of democracy is 
corrupted not only when the spirit of equality is extinct, but likewise when they 
fall into a spirit of extreme equality, and when each citizen would fain be upon a 
level with those whom he has chosen to command him.’4 
 
   Judith Shklar has emphasized Montesquieu’s realization of the fragility of 
liberty. The period of balanced republican liberty, as in Rome, cannot last long. 
‘The very qualities that make a people prosperous and happy cannot survive in a 
wealthy and contented society. Nothing seems to fail like republican success.’5 
Thus the ‘greatest problem of republic regimes is to put off the evil moment 
when they lose their inner balance.’6 Even the freest and most balanced polity he 
could see, England, would succumb. ‘As all human things have an end, the state 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 115 
  2Acton, Life of Creighton, I, 372 
    3Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 149 
    4Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 109 
    5Shklar, Montesquieu, 38 
    6Shklar, Montesquieu, 78 
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we are speaking of will lose its liberty...It will perish when all the legislative 
power shall be more corrupt than the executive.’1 France was even more in 
danger. ‘What he dreaded was the descent of French absolutism into a 
despotism on the Spanish model.’2 Indeed ‘...the entire ancien regime was at 
risk...France was structurally inclined towards despotism.’3 This is a theme also 
picked up by Shackleton. He writes that ‘Without vigilance, oriental tyrrany 
might one day govern France. Servitude, says Montesquieu, begins with sleep.’4 
The reason for this is relatively simple. For ‘most people are governed by 
despotism, because any other form of government, any moderate government, 
necessitates exceedingly careful management and planning, with the most 
thorough balancing and regulating of political power. Despotism on the other 
hand, is uniform and simple. Passions alone are required to establish it...’5  
 
   Montesquieu summarized this inevitable tendency from republic, through 
monarchy, to despotism, and how the equilibrium cannot be maintained. 
 
Most European governments are monarchical, or rather are called so; for I do not know 
whether there ever was a government truly monarchical; at least they cannot have continued 
very long in their original purity. It is a state in which might is right, and which degenerates 
always into a despotism or a republic. Authority can never be equally divided between the 
people and the prince; it is too difficult to maintain an equilibrium; power must diminish on 
one side while it increases on the other; but the advantage is usually with the prince, as he 
commands the army.6 
 
   Control over the army became an increasing threat as technology developed. In 
particular, Montesquieu noted that the use of gunpowder had further tipped the 
balance towards despotism. He wrote, ‘You know that since the invention of 
gunpowder no place is impregnable; that is to say...that there is no longer upon 
the earth a refuge from injustice and violence.’7 And likewise, ‘the invention of 
bombs alone has deprived all the nations of Europe of freedom’ by increasing the 
need for the centralization of military power.8 
 
   Liberty could also be lost in the  ‘the fury of conquest’. Montesquieu was aware 
of two sorts of risk. One was that a country which might have developed internal 
balance and wealth would be over-run by the ‘fury’ of conquest by another. He 
noted how the wealthy civilizations of the Middle East had been ‘laid waste by 
the Tartars, and are still infested by this destructive nation.’9 Particular danger 
lay in being part of a continent, not having naturally defensible borders, and 
being wealthy. His own country of France was a prime example, even when 
compared to Germany. For ‘the Kingdom of Germany was not laid waste and 
annihilated, as it were, like that of France, by that particular kind of war with 
which it had been harassed by the Normans and Saracens. There were less riches 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 161-2 
    2Shklar, Montesquieu, 81 
    3Shklar, Montesquieu, 85 
    4Shackleton, Montesquieu, 272 
    5Shackleton, Montesquieu, 271 
    6Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no. 103 
    7Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no. 106 
    8 Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no.106 
    9Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 335 
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in Germany, fewer cities to plunder, less extent of coast to scour, more marshes 
to get over, more forest to penetrate.’1 Germany’s forests and marshes afforded it 
partial protection, and hence buffered its liberty.  
 
   Mountainous regions, such as Switzerland had even greater advantages. 
Firstly, they were poor areas which were not worth attacking, for ‘in 
mountainous districts, as they have but little, they may preserve what they have. 
The liberty they enjoy, or, in other words, the government they are under, is the 
only blessing worthy of their defence. It reigns, therefore, more in mountainous 
and rugged countries than in those which nature seems to have most favoured.’2 
Moderate, non-absolutist, governments were characteristic of mountain areas. 
‘The mountaineers preserve a more moderate government, because they are not 
so liable to be conquered. They defend themselves easily, and are attacked with 
difficulty; ammunition and provisions are collected and carried against them 
with great expense, for the country furnishes none.’3 
 
   Even better than mountain barriers was water. Islands were the natural home 
of liberty. This was not merely because of their defensive advantages. ‘The 
inhabitants of islands have a higher relish for liberty than those of the continent. 
Islands are commonly of small extent; one part of the people cannot be so easily 
employed to oppress the other; the sea separates them from great empires; 
tyranny cannot so well support itself within a small compass: conquerors are 
stopped by the sea; and the islanders, being without the reach of their arms, 
more easily preserve their own laws.’4 This is, implicitly, Montesquieu’s major 
explanation for that puzzle we noted earlier - the different trajectory of England 
and France. And he explicitly makes the link when showing another advantage 
of being an island. England, he says, is a nation which ‘inhabiting an island, is 
not fond of conquering, because it would be weakened by distant conquests - 
especially as the soil of the island is good, for it has then no need of enriching 
itself by war: and as no citizen is subject to another, each sets a greater value on 
his own liberty than on the glory of one or any number of citizens.’5 
 
   The ‘fury of war’ brings another danger, which Montesquieu showed 
historically in his account of the way in which incessant aggressive warfare had 
been at the root of the collapse of liberty in ancient Rome, and also in the ruin 
caused by Louis XIV’s endless wars of attempted conquest. In a section headed 
‘Of the Augmentation of Troops’ Montesquieu described the inevitable 
Machiavellian law that led continental countries into suicidal wars which then 
led to higher taxation, poverty and despotism. ‘A new distemper has spread itself 
over Europe, infecting our princes, and inducing them to keep up an exorbitant 
number of troops. It has its redoublings, and of necessity becomes contagious. 
For as soon as one prince augments his forces, the rest, of course, do the same; 
so that nothing is gained thereby but the public ruin.’6 Thus out of wealth 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Spirit, II, 260 
    2Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 272 
    3Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 272 
    4Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 273 
    5Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 310 
    6Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 217 
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Europe had created poverty and was threatened with the loss of liberty. ‘We are 
poor with the riches and commerce of the whole world; and soon, by thus 
augmenting our troops, we shall be all soldiers, and be reduced to the very same 
situation as the Tartars.’1  
 
   It was a vicious circle: fear - war - higher taxes - absolutism - more fear and so 
on. ‘The consequence of such a situation is the perpetual augmentation of taxes; 
and the mischief which prevents all future remedy is, that they reckon no more 
upon their revenues, but in waging war against their whole capital.’2 Predation 
was more powerful than production. Indeed it was a topsy-turvy situation where 
the richer a country was naturally, the more impoverished and depopulated it 
would become. ‘Most invasions have, therefore, been made in countries which 
nature seems to have formed for happiness, and as nothing is more nearly allied 
than desolation and invasion, the best provinces are most frequently 
depopulated, while the frightful countries of the North continue always 
inhabited, from their being almost uninhabitable.’3 According to Montesquieu, 
after the terrible devastation of the Thirty Years War and then the military 
adventures of Louis XIV Europe was approaching the situation of India, ‘where a 
multitude of islands and the situation of the land have divided the country into 
an infinite number of petty states, which from causes that we have not here 
room to mention are rendered despotic. There are none there but wretches, 
some pillaging and others pillaged. Their grandees have very moderate fortunes, 
and those whom they call rich have only a bare subsistence.’4 
 
   Montesquieu was able to show in detail how the process worked through his 
study of the rise and decline of the Roman Empire. The essence of the problem 
was that any success was bound to lead to disaster. It is in the nature of political 
institutions to grow, and when they do, they lose their way. Thus it was in the 
very nature of Rome to collapse. 
 
Rome was made for expansion, and its laws were admirable for this purpose. Thus, whatever 
its government had been - whether the power of kings, aristocracy, or a popular state - it never 
ceased undertaking enterprises that made demands on its conduct, and succeeded in them. It 
did not prove wiser than all the other states on earth for a day, but continually. It sustained 
meager, moderate and great prosperity with the same superiority, and had neither successes 
from which it did not profit, nor misfortunes of which it made no use. It lost its liberty because 
it completed the work it wrought too soon.5  
 
   He contrasts the situation here with what happens in despotisms. In despotic 
systems, success makes the despotism ever stronger. In free societies, success 
inevitably corrupts the freedom.  
 
What makes free states last a shorter time than others is that both the 
misfortunes and the successes they encounter almost always cause them to lose 
their freedom. In a state where the people are held in subjection, however, 
successes and misfortunes alike confirm their servitude. A wise republic should 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 217 
    2Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 217 
    3Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 272 
    4Montesquieu, Spirit, I, 257 
    5Montesquieu, Considerations, 94-5 
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hazard nothing that exposes it to either good or bad fortune. The only good to 
which it should aspire is the perpetuation of its condition.  If the greatness of the 
empire ruined the republic, the greatness of the city ruined it no less.1  
 
   The turning point in Rome was when she embarked on imperial conquests 
outside Italy. 
 
When the domination of Rome was limited to Italy, the republic could easily maintain itself. A 
soldier was equally a citizen. Every consul raised an army, and other citizens went to war in 
their turn under his successor. Since the number of troops was not excessive, care was taken 
to admit into the militia only people who had enough property to have an interest in 
preserving the city. Finally, the senate was able to observe the conduct of the generals  and 
removed any thought they might have  of violating their duty. But when the legions crossed 
the Alps and the sea, the warriors, who had to be left in the countries they were subjugating 
for the duration of several campaigns, gradually lost their citizen spirit. And the generals, who 
disposed of armies and kingdoms, sensed their own strength and could obey no longer.2 
 
   Montesquieu summarized his findings succinctly. ‘Here, in a word, is the 
history of the Romans. By means of their maxims they conquered all peoples, 
but when they had succeeded in doing so, their republic could not endure. It was 
necessary to change the government, and contrary maxims employed by the new 
government made their greatness collapse.’3  
 
   The actual process of the fall of Rome according to Montesquieu is helpfully 
summarized by D’Alembert.  
 
He found the causes of their decadence in the very expansion of the state, which transformed 
the riots of its people into civil wars; in wars made in places so distant, that citizens were 
forced into absences of excessive length and lost imperceptibly the spirit essential to 
republics; in the granting of citizenship to too many nations, and the consequent 
transformation of the Roman people into a sort of monster with many heads; in the 
corruption introduced by Asian luxury; in Sulla’s proscription, which debased the nation’s 
spirit and prepared it for slavery; in the necessity felt by the Romans, of subjecting themselves 
to masters, once they felt their liberty to be a burden; in the necessity of changing their 
maxims along with their form of government; in that series of monsters who reigned almost 
without interruption from Tiberius to Nerva, and from Commodus to Constantine; and, 
finally, in the removal and partition of the empire.4  
 
   What had happened in Rome was the best documented example of the danger 
of all continental states. If they were successful, they would have to expand to 
feed their success and protect their borders. But there were no limits and as they 
triumphed on the edges, the centre would become corrupted. It was a 
phenomenon which Montesquieu had seen in the history of the Spanish Empire 
and witnessed at first hand under Louis XIV. 
 
   Yet there is a contradictory message in Montesquieu as well. Although at times 
it looks as if the one quarter of the globe that had hints of non-despotic 
government was tumbling towards the condition of India and China, 
Montesquieu’s argument also rested on the proposition that to a certain extent 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Considerations, 92 
    2Montesquieu, Considerations, 91 
    3Montesquieu, Considerations, 169 
    4Quoted in Richter, Montesquieu, 55 
 25 
 
 
 
Europe was still different. He sensed that for the first time in history Europe was 
becoming the wealthiest and most powerful region in the world, reversing the 
thousands of years when it had been inferior to the Orient. ‘Europe has arrived 
at so high a degree of power that nothing in history can be compared with it, 
whether we consider the immensity of its expenses, the grandeur of its 
engagements, the number of its troops, and the regular payment even of those 
that are least serviceable, and which are kept only for ostentation.’1 He thought 
that this power, and the remnants of the old spirit of liberty, arose from the fact 
that Europe was divided into a number of roughly equal-sized, equally powerful, 
states, so that no universal despotic Empire could grow up. India faced the 
problem of political units that were too small; China of units that were too large. 
Europe, though sucked into incessant wars, at least had some balancing 
elements.  
 
   In a key passage where he put forward his most favoured theory to account for 
the difference of Europe and Asia: 
 
Hence it comes that in Asia the strong nations are opposed to the weak; the warlike, brave, 
and active people touch immediately upon those who are indolent, effeminate, and timorous; 
the one must, therefore, conquer, and the other be conquered. In Europe, on the contrary, 
strong nations are opposed to the strong; and those who join each other have nearly the same 
courage. This is the grand reason of the weakness of Asia, and of the strength of Europe; of the 
liberty of Europe, and of the slavery of Asia: a cause that I do not recollect ever to have seen 
remarked. Hence it proceeds that liberty in Asia never increases; whilst in Europe it is 
enlarged or diminished, according to particular circumstances.2 
 
Asia had been condemned to thousands of years of despotism. Europe vacillated, 
with liberty rising and collapsing, as Montesquieu had seen both in his studies of 
Rome and his knowledge of recent European history. 
 
   Montesquieu had thus put forward several theories to try to account for the 
differential success of liberty - geography in particular. Scattered through his 
works are a number of other theories both at the level of  Europe versus China, 
and of England versus the Continent. One of these lay in the field of religion. At 
the level of Europe versus Asia, he believed that Christianity in itself was an 
antidote to despotism. ‘The Christian religion is a stranger to mere despotic 
power. The mildness so frequently recommended in the gospel is incompatible 
with the despotic rage with which a prince punishes his subjects, and exercises 
himself in cruelty.’3  
 
   What he does not seem to have done is to specify, beyond the gospel message 
of mildness, why Christianity had this effect. Here his experience of the 
concordat between Church and State in France and most of Catholic Europe may 
have made him aware that there was nothing intrinsic to Christianity per se 
which would lead it to be a bulwark against state power. He was aware that the 
mixing of religion and politics was not as extreme as in China. ‘The legislators of 
China went further. They confounded their religion, laws, manners and customs; 
all these were morality, all these were virtue. The precepts relating to these four 
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points were what they called rites; and it was the exact observance of these that 
the Chinese Government triumphed.’1 Yet Christianity could be accommodated 
into a Caesaro-Papist solution as in Louis XIV’s France. 
 
   The puzzle was that in one small part of Europe, in the Protestant north-west, 
there were signs of that desired separation between religion and power. He knew 
‘That we ought not to regulate by the Principles of the canon Law things which 
should be regulated by those of the civil Law.’2 Yet this separation was unusual. 
Since the thing to be explained was religion, the explanation to the question of 
why parts of northern Europe was Protestant must lie elsewhere. Montesquieu’s 
favourite explanation seems to have been the climate. His climatic view of 
religion, which so annoyed the missionaries, applied to religion as a whole. Thus 
he wrote that ‘When a religion adapted to the climate of one country clashes too 
much with the climate of another it cannot be there established; and whenever it 
has been introduced it has been afterwards discarded. It seems to all human 
appearance as if the climate had prescribed the bounds of the Christian and the 
Mohammedan religions.’3 Even within Europe, the colder north was more 
encouraging of liberty, and this liberty and independence led people to want a 
less centralized and despotic religion. Religion was the consequence of liberty, 
not the cause. ‘The reason is plain: the people of the north have, and will forever 
have, a spirit of liberty and independence, which the people of the south have 
not; and, therefore, a religion which has no visible head is more agreeable to the 
independence of the climate than that which has one.’4 
 
   This takes us directly on to his climatic arguments for the differential 
distribution of liberty. Although Montesquieu was not a climatic determinist, he 
did believe that the different climates both within Europe and as between 
Europe and Asia explained a good deal. Although he was a southern European 
from Bordeaux, Montesquieu had a great deal of respect for northern 
Europeans, a respect increased during his wide European tour in 1728-1731. He 
came to the conclusion that ‘If we travel towards the North, we meet with people 
who have few vices, many virtues, and a great share of frankness and sincerity. If 
we draw near the South, we fancy ourselves entirely removed from the verge of 
morality.’5 The harsher  climate of the north, combined with mountains and 
poorer soil made the north into a kind of Spartan ‘dura virum nutrix’ (hard 
nurse of men) which seemed to Montesquieu to lead to hard work and liberty. In 
India, ‘the bad effects of the climate’ was ‘natural indolence’, for the heat led 
people to want to shun agricultural work.6 On the other hand, in the north ‘The 
barrenness of the earth renders men industrious, sober, inured to hardship, 
courageous, and fit for war; they are obliged to procure by labor what the earth 
refuses to bestow spontaneously.’7  
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   That it was not just a harsh climate but the inhospitable and marginal 
resources that were important is shown by his suggestion that it is on the 
water-margins of the continents that trade and liberty will flourish, by forcing 
people into activity. Looking at Europe generally, ‘We everywhere see violence 
and oppression give birth to a commerce founded on economy, while men are 
constrained to take refuge in marshes, in isles, in the shallows of the sea, and 
even on rocks themselves. Thus it was that Tyre, Venice, and the cities of 
Holland were founded.’1 He therefore began to develop the more general theory 
that the poorer the resources of a country, the freer the populace. Rich 
agriculture led to large surpluses which led to predation and hierarchy, either 
from outsiders or insiders. ‘Thus monarchy is more frequently found in fruitful 
countries, and a republican government in those which are not so; and this is 
sometimes a sufficient compensation for the inconveniences they suffer by the 
sterility of the land.’2 Another way of putting this was to suggest that the 
‘goodness of the land, in any country, naturally establishes subjection and 
dependence. The husbandmen, who compose the principal part of the people, 
are not very jealous of their liberty; they are too busy and too intent on their own 
private affairs. A country which overflows with wealth is afraid of pillage, afraid 
of an army.’3 Thus people who lived on arid mountains, marshes or cold and 
inhospitable regions would be recompensed by the avoidance of that despotism 
which lurks on the fertile plains. 
 
   As yet this sounds intriguing, but crude and still fairly deterministic. But 
Montesquieu developed the argument in more complex ways. One was to note 
the effects of climate and resources on the need for commerce and the division 
of labour. He noted that there had been a shift in the balance and extent of trade 
from the south to the north of Europe.  
 
The ancient commerce, so far as it is known to us, was carried on from one port in the 
Mediterranean to another; and was almost wholly confined to the South. Now the people of 
the same climate, having nearly the same things of their own, have not the same need of 
trading amongst themselves as with those of a different climate. The commerce of Europe 
was, therefore, formerly less extended than at present.4  
 
   As an inhabitant of Bordeaux with its famous medieval wine trade to England, 
Montesquieu was well aware of the northern need for southern products. 
However, the ‘trade of Europe is, at present, carried on principally from the 
north to the south; and the difference of climate is the cause that the several 
nations have great occasion for the merchandise of each other.’5 The prime 
example of this development was England. ‘As this nation is situated towards the 
north, and has many superfluous commodities, it must want also a great number 
of merchandise which its climate will not produce: it has therefore entered into a 
great and necessary intercourse with the southern nations.’6 More generally, it 
was the case that ‘In Europe there is a kind of balance between the southern and 
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northern nations. The first have every convenience of life, and few of its wants: 
the last have many wants, and few conveniences.’1 
 
   We noted earlier Montesquieu’s famous connection between Protestantism 
(piety), trade (commerce) and liberty. It is worth considering a little further the 
ways in which he thought commerce was beneficial in relation to liberty. One 
effect was in reducing war and its destructive effects, ‘Peace is the natural effect 
of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally 
dependent.’2 It also encouraged freedom within nations; ‘the people of the North 
have need of liberty, for this can best procure them the means of satisfying all 
those wants which they have received from nature.’3 It encouraged freedom 
from prejudice and good morals. ‘Commerce is a cure for the most destructive 
prejudices; for it is almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable 
manners, there commerce flourishes; and that wherever there is commerce, 
there we meet with agreeable manners.’4 It encouraged all the Protestant ethical 
values, as well as political self-discipline. ‘True is it that when a democracy is 
founded on commerce, private people may acquire vast riches without a 
corruption of morals. This is because the spirit of commerce is naturally 
attended with that of frugality, economy, moderation, labor, prudence, 
tranquillity, order and rule. So long as this spirit subsists, the riches it produces 
have no bad effect.’5  
 
   Montesquieu’s allusion to the ‘corruption of morals’ in fact reveals another 
subtle twist to his argument, for he admitted on other occasions that commerce 
led to a corruption of morality and in particular to the growth of vanity. Yet even 
the negative effects could be positive. ‘Commercial laws, it may be said, improve 
manners for the same reason that they destroy them. They corrupt the purest 
morals.’6 Fashion or vanity, encouraged by trade, could be extremely beneficial. 
‘This fashion is a subject of importance; by encouraging a trifling turn of mind, it 
continually increases the branches of its commerce.’7 Montesquieu recognized 
that ‘Vanity is as advantageous to a government as pride is dangerous. To be 
convinced of this we need only represent, on the one hand, the numberless 
benefits which result from vanity, as industry, the arts, fashions, politeness, and 
taste.’8  
 
   In particular, Montesquieu recognized that commerce, leading to manufacture, 
altered the social hierarchy, leading to a powerful middle class which was a 
bulwark against tyranny. The contrast between an almost entirely agricultural 
population such as China or Russia and the powerful middle class cultures of 
England or Holland was impressive. ‘Commerce itself is inconsistent with the 
Russian laws. The people are composed only of slaves employed in agriculture, 
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and of slaves called ecclesiastics or gentlemen, who are the lords of those slaves; 
there is then nobody left for the third estate, which ought to be composed of 
mechanics and merchants.’1 
 
   Returning now to the question of the effects of climate and terrain, we can see 
how complex Montesqieu’s reasoning was - for instance we have climate, leading 
to  commerce, encouraging a middle class, which formed a bulwark against 
despotism. Furthermore, he realized that it was not just the climate itself, but its 
link to political boundaries that was important. 
   
   The climatic influence lay as much in the sharp variations of climate within a 
small area as in the actual climate. The effects would also vary depending on the 
political boundaries. One of Montesquieu’s theories was that if all necessities 
could be produced within one political boundary, this would lead towards 
despotism, whereas if necessities had to be exchanged between political entities, 
this would encourage freedom. Yet it was not just trade in itself. Montesquieu 
noted the self-sufficiency of Egypt. ‘The Egyptians - a people who by their 
religion and their manners were averse to all communication with strangers - 
had scarcely at that time any foreign trade. They enjoyed a fruitful soil and great 
plenty. Their country was the Japan of those times; it possessed everything 
within itself.’2 The remark, ‘The Japan of those times’ is intriguing and is 
expanded elsewhere.  
 
Let us next consider Japan. The vast quantity of what they receive is the cause of the vast 
quantity of merchandise they send abroad. Things are thus in as nice an equilibrium as if the 
importation and exportation were but small. Besides, this kind of exuberance in the state is 
productive of a thousand advantages; there is a greater consumption, a greater quantity of 
those things on which the arts are exercised; more men employed, and more numerous means 
of acquiring power; exigencies may also happen that require a speedy assistance, which so 
opulent a state can better afford than any other.3 
 
This is slightly contradictory, of course, for despite the fact that Montesquieu 
must have been aware, as he earlier shows, that Japan had in the 1620s closed 
itself to foreign trade, he talks of ‘the vast quantity of merchandise they send 
abroad.’ Yet the passage is valuable as an indication of what Montesquieu 
thought of the stimulating effects of trade on the arts and on wealth in general.  
 
  In another striking passage he describes the connection between liberty and 
commerce, for not only was trade a cause of liberty, it was also a consequence, 
for it could only flourish where there was a certain freedom. ‘Commerce is 
sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it 
traverses the earth, flies from the places where it is oppressed, and stays where it 
has liberty to breathe: it reigns at present where nothing was formerly to be seen 
but deserts, seas, and rocks; and whence it once reigned now there are only 
deserts.’4 It was a fragile, fickle, yet powerful force. Just as it could not have its 
full effect within a large, bounded and inward turning Empire, likewise it was 
just as harmful if there was too much space between the political entities, as 
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when there was too little. Thus he noted that isolation and poverty were also 
linked. He believed that the fact that most African coastal societies were still 
tribal, was principally ‘because the small countries capable of being inhabited 
are separated from each other by large and almost uninhabitable tracts of land.’1 
 
   There was yet another chain of causation leading from soil and climate towards 
liberty and this was by way of the agricultural system, in particular the type of 
crops grown. Montesquieu began to develop a theory that population densities 
and degrees of liberty were connected. He noted four major agricultural regions 
in the world and their attendant population densities. ‘Pasture- lands are but 
little peopled, because they find employment only for a few. Corn-lands employ 
a great many men, and vineyards infinitely more.’2 This roughly corresponds to 
the three regions of Europe - the pastoral north, the corn-growing middle, and 
the vineyards of his own Bordeaux and the Mediterranean region, and the 
increasing population densities associated with them. All of these were 
compatible with the moderate liberty of republic and monarchy - republics in 
the pastoral or mixed areas, monarchy in the corn and vineyard areas. 
 
   Against the whole of Europe he placed Asia, with the fourth major system, 
namely wet rice cultivation. He set out the connection between dense population 
and rice cultivation, particularly in China, in a number of places and it seems to 
have been one of his implicit explanations for the fact that China seemed to have 
reached a plateau of wealth and to be the archetype of despotism. He thought 
that ‘China is the place where the customs of the country can never be changed’3, 
a place where ‘the laws, manners, and customs, even those which seem quite 
indifferent, such as their mode of dress, are the same to this very day...as they 
were a thousand years ago.’4 Since the connections between rice, 
over-population, and the prevalence of despotism over three-quarters of the 
globe is central to his argument, it is worth elaborating on his description of the 
links. 
 
   Montesquieu describes the intensive nature of rice cultivation, which both 
sucks up labour, and provides sustenance. 
 
In countries productive of rice, they are at vast pains in watering the land: a great number of 
men must therefore be employed. Besides, there is less land required to furnish subsistence 
for a family than in those which produce other kinds of grain. In fine, the land which is 
elsewhere employed in raising cattle serves immediately for the subsistence of man; and the 
labor which in other places is performed by cattle is there performed by men; so that the 
culture of the soil becomes to man an immense manufacture.5  
 
   The importance of rice was supplemented by Montesquieu’s now rejected 
views that hot climates led to higher fertility through directly stimulating sexual 
activity and female reproductive capacity. ‘The climate of China is surprisingly 
favourable to the propagation of the human species. The women are the most 
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prolific in the whole world.’1 More plausibly, anticipating Smith and Malthus, he 
argued that there was the universal desire for marriage as soon as possible. 
‘Wherever a place is found in which two persons can live commodiously, there 
they enter into marriage. Nature has a sufficient propensity to it, when 
unrestrained by the difficulty of subsistence.’2 Rice being so productive and 
being able to accommodate more and more labour this made early marriage 
widespread and hence the population rose rapidly so that ‘China grows every day 
more populous, notwithstanding the exposing of children’ and ‘the inhabitants 
are incessantly employed in tilling the lands for their subsistence.’3  
 
   He added a third reason why the Chinese population grew so quickly, which 
anticipates more recent theories. This was to do with the attitudes towards the 
family. Although he does not link this explicitly to Confucianism or the descent 
system, his observation is perceptive. 
 
If the population of China is enormous, it is only the result of a certain way of thinking; for 
since children look upon their parents as gods, reverence them as such in this life, and honour 
them after death with sacrifices by means of which they believe that their souls, absorbed into 
Tyen, recommence a new existence, each one is bent on increasing a family so dutiful in this 
life, and so necessary for the next.4 
 
   The negative effect of this was that people lived on the verge of starvation, 
despite their immense toil and the productiveness of agriculture. ‘The people, by 
the influence of the climate, may grow so numerous, and the means of subsisting 
may be so uncertain, as to render a universal application to agriculture 
extremely necessary’5 This also suggests that almost all effort had to go into 
agriculture rather than, as in Europe, into commerce and manufacture. Even 
thus, ‘China, like all other countries that live chiefly upon rice, is subject to 
frequent famines.’6 It was a Malthusian tread-mill, for ‘in China, the women are 
so prolific, and the human species multiplies so fast, that the lands, though never 
so much cultivated, are scarcely sufficient to support the inhabitants.’7 The only 
compensation was that the blind fury of the populace when famine struck was 
the one check on the rulers and hence tempered, somewhat, the despotism. ‘In 
spite of tyranny, China by the force of its climate will be ever populous, and 
triumph over the tyrannical oppressor.’8 This was because, ‘From the very 
nature of things, a bad administration is here immediately punished. The want 
of subsistence in so populous a country produces sudden disorders.’9 Despotism 
it might be, but a despotism tempered by the need to provide sufficient ‘bread 
and circuses’, or rather ‘rice and ritual’, to stop the millions of long-suffering 
Chinese from rising to overthrow their masters. 
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   Another argument concerning the relation of physical environment and 
political absolutism concerns the size of political unit. Montesquieu early 
developed a sort of political equivalent to the argument that ‘small is beautiful’. 
He summarized his theory succinctly, that ‘the natural property of small states to 
be governed as a republic, of middling ones to be subject to a monarch, and of 
large empires to be swayed by a despotic prince...’1 The reasons for this are 
complex. One seems to be that ‘A large empire supposes a despotic authority in 
the person who governs. It is necessary that the quickness of the prince’s 
resolutions should supply the distance of the places they are sent to.’2 This link 
was earlier foreshadowed as we have seen in Montesquieu’s theory that it was 
the predatory expansion of Roman civilization outside Italy which inevitably 
changed it from a Republic into a despotic absolutism - a fear which was brought 
alive again by the aggressive policies of Louis XIV and only avoided by his 
failures.  
 
   The reasons why, in the end, the Roman Empire and despotism collapsed, and 
why neither the Hapsburgs nor Louis XIV had been able to make Europe into 
one vast despotic Empire, unlike Russia or China, were basically, geographical. 
 
In Asia they have always had great empires; in Europe these could never subsist. Asia has 
larger plains; it is cut out into much more extensive divisions by mountains and seas; and as it 
lies more to the south, its springs are more easily dried up; the mountains are less covered 
with snow; and the rivers being not so large form more contracted barriers.3  
 
For this reason, ‘Power in Asia ought, then, to be always despotic: for if their 
slavery was not severe they would make a division inconsistent with the nature 
of the country.’4 In Europe on the other hand, divided into middle sized states, 
rulers have to maintain a balance sufficient to keep the enthusiasm and support 
of their citizens. ‘In Europe the natural division forms many nations of a 
moderate extent, in which the ruling by laws is not incompatible with the 
maintenance of the state: on the contrary, it is so favourable to it, that without 
this the state would fall into decay, and become a prey to its neighbours.’5 This 
balance between middle sized political units makes it impossible to set up 
permanent empires, and encourages liberty. ‘It is this which has formed a genius 
for liberty that renders every part extremely difficult to be subdued and 
subjected to a foreign power, otherwise than by the laws and the advantage of 
commerce.’6  
 
   This analysis has been summarized and commented on by Durkheim, and was 
important in shaping the latter’s thought. He suggests that ‘the major role’ in 
Montesquieu’s ideas of what shapes the form of a society is played by ‘the 
volume of the society’. In small-scale societies there will be republics, because 
the ‘affairs of the community are at all times present to the eyes and mind of 
every single citizen.’ Thus those in power are only the first among equals. 
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But if the society grows larger, everything changes...The increasing differentiation of society 
gives rise to divergent outlooks and objectives. Further, the sovereign power becomes so great 
that the person who exercises it is far above all others.  The society cannot but change from 
the republican to the monarchic form. But if the volume increases still further and becomes 
excessive, monarchy gives way to despotism, for a vast empire cannot subsist unless the 
prince has the absolute power enabling him to maintain unity among peoples scattered over 
so wide an area. So close is the relationship between the nature of a society and its volume 
that the principle peculiar to each type ceases to operate if the population increases or 
diminishes excessively.1  
 
Durkheim admits that although there are a number of exceptions and objections 
to this. ‘Nevertheless, Montesquieu displays great insight in attributing such 
influence to the number of social units. This factor is indeed of the highest 
importance in determining the nature of societies, and in our opinion accounts 
for the chief differences between them. Religion, ethics, law, the family, etc., 
cannot be the same in a large society as in a small one.’2 
 
   For Montesquieu, therefore, there were two levels of analysis. Within the world 
as a whole, three-quarters was covered by ‘despotic’ regimes - that is China, 
India and the Near East, Turkey and Russia. Only western Europe was relatively 
free, enjoying monarchical and occasionally republican government. This was 
roughly the same picture that Machiavelli had drawn in the sixteenth century. 
   
   Although Montesquieu does not explicitly make the link, the line between 
feudal-monarchical systems, Japan in the East, and western Europe in the West, 
and  bureaucratic absolutisms elsewhere, was exactly the line of Mongol 
conquest. Some might suggest a causal connection, lying somewhere in the 
devastating effect of Mongol invasions on all Montesquieu’s middling-level 
counter-balances to autocratic power, which were removed in each of the 
Mongol invasions. Although they spared some cities, the Mongols tended to level 
a great deal, destroying the centre - the towns, universities,  small 
concentrations of wealth and power laboriously built up and left only a massive 
impoverished peasantry and a vacuum at the top to be filled by an absolute ruler. 
This happened several times in China, the Middle East, and at least once in 
Russia. But the Mongols stopped on the borders of Austria, and the fleets of 
Kublai Khan were halted on the beaches of Japan. Only where they did not 
penetrate did successful commercial capitalist systems with mixed governments 
develop.  
 
   Yet this is moving well beyond Montesquieu - though he hints at this line of 
argument when he compares the effects of different kind of invasions. In his 
Pensées he contrasted the effect of Islamic and Norse/Germanic invasions, and 
the innate tendencies towards centralization, working much faster after the 
former than the latter type of invasion. ‘“From time to time there take place in 
the world those inundations of peoples that impose everywhere their customs 
and mores. The inundation of the Muslims brought despotism; the Northmen, 
the government of nobles. It took nine hundred years to abolish that 
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government and to establish, in every state, monarchy...That is why there has 
always been an ebb and flow of empire and liberty.”‘1 
 
   Montesquieu drew a second division, within Europe. Anticipating Marc Bloch,2 
he saw that Europe comprised two agrarian civilizations, a Roman law 
civilization south of a line running through France and a Germanic common law 
civilization in northern France, northern Germany and to the northwards. This 
was an old and enduring line. There was a further division, between the 
absolutist tending monarchies of most of western Europe, and the few oases of 
open, liberal, government. It was in two such countries that his books published 
were published, in Holland and in Switzerland. It was in the third, England, that 
he was able to explore the ways in which peace, prosperity, liberty and piety 
could all flourish side by side. 
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3. THE DEFENCE OF LIBERTY 
 
   Even before he visited England, Montesquieu was aware that it was a country 
with a peculiarly anti-authoritarian spirit. In the person of Uzbek, he describes 
the English thus.  
 
All the nations of Europe are not equally submissive to their princes: the impatient humour of 
the English, for instance, leaves their king hardly any time to make his authority felt. 
Submission and obedience are virtues upon which they flatter themselves but little. On this 
subject they say most amazing things. According to them there is only one tie which can bind 
men, and that is gratitude: husband and wife, father and son, are only bound to each other by 
their mutual affection, or by the services they do each other: and these various motives of 
obligation are the origin of all kingdoms and communities. But if a prince, instead of making 
the lives of his subjects happy, attempts to oppress and ruin them, the  basis of obedience is 
destroyed; nothing binds them, nothing attaches them to him; and they return to their natural 
liberty. They maintain that all unlimited power must be unlawful, because it cannot have had 
a lawful origin. For, we cannot, say they, give to another  more power over us than we 
ourselves have: now, we have not unlimited power over ourselves; for example we have no 
right to take our own lives: no one upon earth then, they conclude, has such a power.’1  
 
Referring to the English Civil War, Montesquieu wrote ‘Thus the people of 
England, finding themselves stronger than one of their kings, pronounced it high 
treason in a prince to make war upon his subjects.2  
 
   It was only after he had visited England, and united his reading of Locke and 
others with attendance at parliamentary debates and courts of law, that  
Montesquieu saw how the system worked. His account is famous, and is 
helpfully summarized by Sorel as follows. 
 
To make the laws and control their execution, there is a body of legislators composed of 
representatives of the people elected by a system of suffrage almost universal, for it must 
include ‘all citizens...except those who are in such a low condition that they are considered to 
have no will of their own;’ there is an upper chamber composed of hereditary members 
sharing with the legislative assembly in making the laws, except those relating to taxes, in 
regard to which the upper chamber is granted only the right to oppose for fear lest it be 
corrupted by the crown; there is an executive power entrusted to a monarch, because just as 
legislation demands deliberation, which is the act of several persons, so execution requires 
volition, which properly belongs to but one; the executive has not necessarily the power of 
originating the laws, and takes no part in debates, but has the right to veto new laws; if there is 
no monarch, the executive power must not be entrusted to members of the legislative 
assembly, because then the two powers would be blended; the legislative assembly can judge 
neither the conduct nor the person of the monarch, because this would be a confusion of 
powers; but though the monarch is inviolable and sacred, his ministers can be called to 
account and punished. The two chambers meet at stated times, and each year vote on the 
amount of the taxes and the number of soldiers.’3 
 
 The results of this balance of powers was a set of freedoms which Montesquieu 
elaborated in several famous chapters of the Spirit of the Laws. 
 
  There was equality of law. ‘Their laws not being made for one individual more 
than another, each considers himself a monarch; and, indeed the men of this 
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nation are rather confederates than fellow-subjects.’1 There was religious 
toleration and liberty. 
 
With regard to religion, as in this state every subject has a free will, and must consequently be 
either conducted by the light of his own mind or by the caprice of fancy, it necessarily follows 
that everyone must either look upon all religion with indifference, by which means they are 
led to embrace the established religion, or they must be zealous for religion in general, by 
which means the number of sects is increased.2 
 
There was intellectual freedom. ‘As the enjoyment of liberty, and even its 
support and preservation consist in every man’s being allowed to speak his 
thoughts, and to lay open his sentiments, a citizen in this state will say or write 
whatever the laws do not expressly forbid to be said or written.’3 There was 
freedom to change political allegiance. ‘Every individual is independent, and 
being commonly led by caprice and humour, frequently changes parties.’4  There 
was freedom to engage in whatever activity or occupation one liked. In France, 
for instance, the nobility were kept out of trade. ‘In a monarchical government, it 
is contrary to the spirit of commerce that any of the nobility should be 
merchants.’5 The reverse was true in England and this might be a cause as well 
as a consequence of political freedom. ‘It is contrary to the spirit of monarchy to 
admit the nobility into commerce. The custom of suffering the nobility of 
England to trade is one of those things which have there mostly contributed to 
weaken the monarchical government.’6 In sum, this was a proud and free nation; 
‘As no subject fears another, the whole nation is proud: for the pride of kings is 
founded only on their independence. Free nations are haughty; others may more 
properly be called vain.’7 All of this meant that it did not really matter how 
competent the government was. ‘In a free nation it is very often a matter of 
indifference whether individuals reason well or ill; it is sufficient that they do 
reason: hence springs that liberty which is a security from the effects of these 
reasonings.’8 
 
   In many ways Montesquieu’s more general definitions  of the essence of 
political liberty were refinements from the actual situation as he perceived it in 
England. He defined liberty as ‘a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if 
a citizen could do what they forbid he would no longer be possessed of liberty, 
because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.’9 Liberty and desire 
should be identical. ‘In governments, that is, in societies directed by laws, liberty 
can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being 
constrained to do what we ought not to will.’10 Thus the art of good government 
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was to harmonize individual desire and government policy, using the minimum 
of force.  
 
I have often inquired which form of government is most conformable to reason. It seems to 
me that the most perfect is that which attains its object with the least friction; so that the 
government which leads men by following their propensities and inclinations is the most 
perfect. If under a mild government the people are as submissive as under a severe one, the 
former is to be preferred, since it is more rational, severity being a motive foreign to reason.1  
 
   There is bound to be some loss of liberty, but it should be minimal. We are told 
that ‘In his notebook he described liberty as a good net in which the fish do not 
feel constrained.’2 Political liberty consisted of freedom from fear. ‘The political 
liberty of the subject is a tranquillity of mind arising from the opinion each 
person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the 
government be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another.’3 Or 
again, ‘Political liberty consists in security, or, at least, in the opinion that we 
enjoy security.’4 ‘Philosophic liberty consists in the free exercise of the will; or at 
least, if we must speak agreeably to all systems, in an opinion that we have the 
free exercise of our will.’5  
 
   Thus he believed that ‘the safety of the people is the supreme law’6 and that 
‘This security is never more dangerously attacked than in public or private 
accusations. It is, therefore, on the goodness of criminal laws that the liberty of 
the subject principally depends.’7 England, with its freedom from torture, 
freedom from the inquisitorial process of Roman law and the absence of secret 
accusations was the paramount example of such ‘liberty of the subject’, so 
distant from the world of examining magistrates and torture over which 
Montesquieu in his youth had presided. 
 
   The added twist to Montesquieu’s argument was that liberty was not merely 
desirable in itself, but seemed to lead, through trade and manufacture, to 
economic and thence to political power. Sorel is right that ‘Montesquieu did not 
foresee the speedy advent and prodigious development of modern democracy. 
Still less would he believe it possible to organize democratic republics in vast 
countries.’8 He was also right in detecting a certain disdain in Montesquieu’s 
tone when he wrote ‘The politicians of our day talk of nothing but manufactures, 
commerce, wealth and even luxury!’9 Yet he is only half right when he continues 
that ‘Montesquieu did not suspect that these manufactures, this commerce, this 
wealth, and even this luxury, which he considered incompatible with 
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democracies, would one day become their corner-stone, and that this revolution 
would be effected in his own country and permeate all Europe.’1  
 
   Montesquieu was living just at the point when it was becoming obvious that 
England and Holland and indeed much of north-western Europe, were rapidly 
becoming both the freest and the richest parts of Europe. This was being done by 
a hitherto untried route. Almost all previous nations had made wealth 
subservient to power, that is to say  predation dominated production. But 
England had reversed this. ‘Other nations have made the interests of commerce 
yield to those of politics; the English, on the contrary, have ever made their 
political interests give way to those of commerce.’2 This is a first hint of the later 
theme of ‘a nation ruled by shop keepers’ which would be fully developed by 
Adam Smith.  
 
   Linked to this reversal was the curious down-grading of the military 
profession. Unlike every other major western country and particularly the 
Romans, in England ‘Military men are there regarded as belonging to a 
profession which may be useful but is often dangerous, and as men whose very 
services are burdensome to the nation: civil qualifications are therefore more 
esteemed than the military.’3 Montesquieu noted a similar development in that 
‘other queen of the sea, the Republic of Holland, so respected in Europe, and so 
feared in Asia, where its merchants behold many a king bow to the dust before 
them.’4  
 
   Montesquieu noted the general shift from the Catholic south to the Protestant 
north, which he associated with wealth, population and power. 
 
Before the humiliation of the power of Spain, the Catholics were much stronger than the 
Protestants. Little by little the latter have arrived at an equality. The Protestants will become 
richer and more powerful, and the Catholics will grow weaker. The Protestant countries ought 
to be, and are, in fact, more populous than the Catholic ones; from which it follows, firstly, 
that their revenue is greater, because it increases in proportion to the number of those who 
pay taxes; secondly, that their lands are better cultivated; lastly, that commerce is more 
prosperous, because there are more people who have fortunes to make; and that, with 
increased wants, there is an increase of resources to supply them.5  
 
The last point, concerning the tax base, the conversion of wealth into power, is 
amplified thus. ‘There is no Protestant prince who does not levy upon his people 
much heavier taxes than the Pope draws from his subjects; yet the latter are 
poor, while the former live in affluence. Commerce puts life into all ranks among 
the Protestants, and celibacy lays its hand of death upon all interests among the 
Catholics.’6  
 
   The populousness is partly caused, as he notes, by the absence of celibacy. It is 
also because freedom attracts people. Montesquieu himself had personally 
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experienced this. Not only had he seen the Huguenots flee from France after the 
Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, but also in Bordeaux he had seen the 
after-effects of intolerance of religious minorities in the way the large group of 
Protestants, including his wife’s family, had been treated. Thus he wrote from 
the heart when he stated, 
 
The propagation of the species is wonderfully aided by a mild government. All republics are a 
standing proof of this; especially Switzerland and Holland, which, with regard to the nature of 
the land, are the two worst countries in Europe, and which are yet the most populous. 
Nothing attracts strangers more than liberty, and its accompaniment, wealth: the latter is 
sought after for itself, and our necessity leads us into those countries in which we find the 
former.1  
 
Anticipating much later speculation on the role of marginalized religious 
minorities such as the Jews or Quakers, he wrote ‘It is worthy of note that those 
who profess tolerated creeds usually prove more useful to their country than 
those who profess the established faith; because, being excluded from all 
honours, and unable to distinguish themselves except by wealth and its shows, 
they are led to acquire riches by their labour, and to embrace the most toilsome 
of occupations.’2 This was another good reason for toleration rather than the 
oppression he had witnessed in Spain and France. 
 
   Montesquieu noticed that England had a very productive agriculture. Such 
were its surpluses that he relaxed his general rule and admitted that it could 
afford some luxuries. ‘In England the soil produces more grain than is necessary 
for the maintenance of such as cultivate the land and of those who are employed 
in the woollen manufactures. This country may be therefore allowed to have 
some trifling arts and consequently luxury.’3 The country’s obvious wealth was 
not based on producing unnecessary things, but in particular on its woollen 
manufacture and trade. ‘They enjoy a solid luxury, founded, not on the 
refinements of vanity, but on that of real wants; they ask nothing of nature but 
what nature can bestow.’4 All this was very helpful, and supplemented its 
greatest natural advantage, which was the fact that it was an island. 
 
The ruling nation inhabiting a large island, and being in possession of a great trade, has with 
extraordinary ease grown powerful at sea; and as the preservation of its liberties requires that 
it should have neither strongholds nor fortresses nor land forces, it has occasion for a 
formidable navy to defend it against invasions; a navy which must be superior to that of all 
other powers, who, employing their treasures in wars on land, have not sufficient for those at 
sea.5  
 
   This advantage also extended to its overseas policies. It was, not, unlike 
war-weary France, or Italy in the expansion of Rome, lured into the folly of 
endless land wars. ‘This nation, inhabiting an island, is not fond of conquering, 
because it would be weakened by distant conquests - especially as the soil of the 
island is so good, for it has then no need of enriching itself by war.’6 Thus it has 
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become a ‘trading people’ and ‘If this nation sends colonies abroad, it must 
rather be to extend its commerce than its dominion.’1 
 
   The final ingredient for England’s power arose from a cunning combination of 
its natural wealth and its freedom. Here Montesquieu developed an interesting 
idea of the relations between political balance and the use of the citizen’s wealth  
Montesquieu contrasted this with  the usual policy of oppressive governments, 
as a parable. ‘When the savages of Louisiana are desirous of fruit, they cut the 
tree to the root, and gather the fruit ... This is an emblem of despotic 
government.’2 In such a setting of insecurity, as soon as a surplus is generated it 
is scooped off. This affects everybody, and in particular the chances of 
developing extensive merchant or manufacturing wealth. ‘Hence it is that a 
merchant under this government is unable to carry on an extensive commerce; 
he lives from hand to mouth; and were he to encumber himself with a large 
quantity of merchandise, he would lose more by the exorbitant interest he must 
give for money than he could possibly get by the goods.’3  
 
   The high rate of interest was also a result of the insecurity and despotism. ‘In 
those Eastern countries, the greater part of the people are secure in nothing; 
there is hardly any proportion between the actual possession of a sum and the 
hopes of receiving it again after having lent it: usury, then, must be raised in 
proportion to the danger of insolvency.’4 Ironically, therefore, the tax base 
shrank and less could be extracted. A vicious circle was entered. Whatever was 
available was taken away and every sprout was consumed. Hardly the way to 
encourage manufacture or even agriculture. In such a despotic state ‘the incomes 
of the subjects would cease almost entirely, and consequently that of the prince. 
There would hardly be any exchange of goods among the citizens, and there 
would be an end of that circulation of wealth, and of that increase of revenue, 
which arises from the dependence of the arts upon each other; each person 
would live upon his land, and would take from it only just enough to keep him 
from dying of hunger.’5 He had seen the effects of the consequent downward 
spiral in the case of Rome. ‘No states are in greater need of taxes than those 
which are growing weaker, so that burdens must be increased in proportion as 
the ability to pay decreases. Soon, in the Roman provinces, taxes became 
unbearable.’6 
 
   The reverse of this was a situation where the citizens were not molested too 
early and only their surpluses were regularly collected. This was the situation in 
a place like England or Holland. ‘It is a general rule that taxes may be heavier in 
proportion to the liberty of the subject, and that there is a necessity for reducing 
them in proportion to the increase of slavery. This has always been and always 
will be the case.’7 The regularity and certainty, in other words a fixed amount, 
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was also important - a theme developed by Adam Smith. For ‘as the people have 
a certain knowledge of the necessity of submitting to those taxes, they pay them 
from the well-founded hope of their discontinuance; their burdens are heavy, 
but they do not feel their weight: while in other states the uneasiness is infinitely 
greater than the evil.’1 Furthermore, since the people identify themselves with 
their rulers and feel attached to their political system they will, in a free state, 
make voluntary sacrifices of a kind which are greater than those that can be 
forced out of them in a despotic ones. Again referring to England, he wrote that 
‘This nation is passionately fond of liberty, because this liberty is real; and it is 
possible for it, in its defence, to sacrifice its wealth, its ease, its interest, and to 
support the burden of the heaviest taxes, even such as a despotic prince durst 
not lay upon his subjects.’2  
 
   The moral of this was that it was in the interests of both citizens and those in 
power that wealth should be widely distributed. ‘That very equality of the 
citizens which generally produces equality in their fortunes, brings plenty and 
vigour into all the parts of the body politic, and spreads these blessings 
throughout the whole state.  It is not so in countries subject to arbitrary power: 
the prince, the courtiers, and a few private persons, possess all the wealth, while 
all the rest groan in extreme poverty.3 Thus one could conclude ‘that if a prince is 
to be powerful, it is necessary that his subjects should live in luxury; he ought to 
labour to procure all sorts of superfluities with as much care as the necessities of 
life.’4 It was a partnership, rather than an opposition. And from this derived 
Montesquieu’s famous definition of taxation. ‘Each citizen contributes to the 
revenues of the state a portion of his property in order that his tenure of the rest 
may be more secure.’5 Furthermore, the citizens trust their government and are 
therefore prepared to lend it immense sums in its hour of need - which would 
not be the case in a despotism. Such borrowing unites citizens and State even 
more closely. ‘To preserve its liberty, it borrows of its subjects: and the subjects, 
seeing that its credit would be lost if ever it were conquered, have a new motive 
to make fresh efforts in defence of its liberty.’6  
 
   Thus a free people can attempt tasks apparently well beyond their strength, as 
Montesquieu had seen with the successes of the Duke of Marlborough in his 
battles against France, and in the expanding colonies of England. ‘It is possible 
for it to undertake things above its natural strength, and employ against its 
enemies immense sums of fictitious riches, which the credit and nature of the 
government may render real.’7 From very early on the English had enjoyed 
security of real property from arbitrary seizure by the government ‘The Magna 
Charta of England provides against the seizing of the lands or revenues of a 
debtor, when his movable or personal goods are sufficient to pay, and he is 
willing to give them up to his creditors; thus all the goods of an Englishman 
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represented money.’1 This was one of the reasons behind Montesquieu’s affir-
mation that, as Locke and others had argued, private property should be 
safeguarded. ‘Let us, therefore, lay down a certain maxim, that whenever the 
public good happens to be the matter in question, it is not for the advantage of 
the public to deprive an individual of his property, or even to retrench the least 
part of it by law, or a  
political regulation.’2 
 
 * 
 
   Montesquieu was thus able to move back and forth between an abstract model 
of a wealthy, pious and liberal nation and its realization in England. Yet, beyond 
its island advantage, this still left open the question of why England was so 
different. Of course, part of the answer lay in geography and climate, but 
Montesquieu was not prepared to stop there. Reflecting on this very question he 
wrote, ‘I do not deny that the climate may have produced a great part of the 
laws, manners, and customs of this nation; but I maintain that its manners and 
customs have a close connection with its laws.’3 The ‘close connection’, an 
anticipation of Weber’s ‘elective affinity’, does not posit a necessary causal chain, 
but it allows Montesquieu to embark on his clear and sympathetic account of the 
constitutional and legal arrangements in England, an account which is very 
heavily based on Locke and Bolingbroke’s work. 
 
   Montesquieu’s greatness, as we noted earlier, lay in his recognition that the 
solution to many problems lay not in the things themselves, but in the relations 
between things. He was aware that there seemed to be a natural tendency as a 
nation became wealthier for it to expand and predate on others. This in turn 
seemed to lead to a growing concentration of power, or, put in another way, a 
breaking down of the division between spheres, solidifying them into one 
despotic whole. Freedom and progress, however, consisted in holding them 
apart. 
 
   The normal tendency towards despotism, even within west European nations, 
is best shown by Montesquieu’s study of the Roman Empire. There he reveals 
how an inevitable pressure occurs. A small nation is successful, but its very 
success engenders the need to expand farther, and so it goes on. But each 
expansion shifts the balance away from republic and openness towards a more 
powerful centre so that one day the people wake up in a totalitarian state. This in 
turn leads to corruption and final collapse. 
 
   The model he developed for China is somewhat different. There was the same 
move outwards to fill the surrounding vacuum of power until the whole great 
plain of China was one huge Empire. In this Empire, not only, as we have seen, 
was religion and polity mixed, but likewise kinship and polity. He noted that 
‘This empire is formed on the plan of a government of a family. If you diminish 
the paternal authority, or even if you retrench the ceremonies which express 
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your respect for it, you weaken the reverence due to magistrates, who are 
considered as fathers...’1 Thus kinship allegiances strengthen political ties and 
vice versa. It is a true patriarchal system, power lying in the hands of the 
father/Emperor. The differences between this and the Roman situation is that 
the Chinese is far more deeply embedded. Partly because of the geography of 
Europe, partly because of the agriculture, partly because of the differences of 
religion, China’s despotism could not be overturned, unlike Rome’s. From time 
to time China was over-run, by Mongols, Manchus and others. At other times it 
split into pieces. Yet it always returned quickly to its monolithic shape.  
 
   Having explained the inter-connectedness of Chinese society and government. 
Montesquieu continues ‘Hence it follows that the laws of China are not 
destroyed by conquest. Their customs, manners, laws, and religion being the 
same thing, they cannot change all these at once; and as it will happen that 
either the conqueror or the conquered must change, in China it has always been 
the conqueror.’2 The essence was the absence of a separation of powers, not only 
between economy, society and polity, but at the level of the rulers, between 
legislative, executive and judiciary. Thus ‘Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a 
moderate government’ because the prince left the judiciary powers ‘to his 
subjects’. On the other hand, as could be seen, ‘In Turkey, where these three 
powers are united in the Sultan’s person, the subjects groan under the most 
dreadful oppression.’3 
 
   The secret of liberty was thus firstly a separation of spheres - economy from 
polity, religion from polity, religion from economy, and society (kinship) from 
polity, religion and economy. This would be reflected in and re-enforced at the 
governmental level by the separation and balance between legislature, executive 
and judiciary. What was needed was both separation and  balance. To prevent 
abuse of power, ‘it is necessary from the very  nature of things that power should 
be a check to power. A government may  be so constituted, as no man shall be 
compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to 
abstain  from things which the law permits.’4 For instance, ‘there is no liberty, if 
the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it 
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to 
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.’5  As 
Shklar put it, ‘The central and continuous theme of the Spirit of the Laws is 
that the independence of the courts of law more than any other institution 
separates moderate from despotic regimes.’6 Even within each of these there 
should be further separations and balances. For instance, as in England with its 
balance between Commons, Lords and Crown, the ‘legislative body being 
composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of 
rejecting. They are both restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by 
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the legislative.’1 This idea was partly derived from Locke, but as a number of 
authors have pointed out Montesquieu went far beyond Locke. He probably 
owed more to Bolingbroke and this is a case where a partial myth was created 
through a creative mis-reading of the English political system.2 It would be a 
fruitful myth, however, for it formed the basis of the American constitution.  
 
   The problem, of course, was how to achieve such a balance in the first place 
and then, more difficult still, how to prevent the balance or dynamic harmony 
from being lost. Montesquieu had noted the point in Roman history when ‘the 
harmony of the three powers was lost.’3 Things cannot stand still and the 
dynamic tension had to be maintained over time. ‘These three powers should 
naturally form a state  of repose or inaction. But as there is a necessity for 
movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in 
concert.’4 A middling balance was essential: ‘political, like moral good, lying 
always between two extremes.’5 Any excess or lurch in one direction, even some-
thing intrinsically good, when taken to its extreme, was dangerous. Anticipating 
Tocqueville, Montesquieu wrote that ‘Democracy has, therefore, two excesses to 
avoid - the spirit of inequality, which leads to aristocracy or monarchy, and the 
spirit of extreme equality, which leads to despotic power, as the latter is comple-
ted by conquest.’6 
 
   How then could the precarious balance be maintained? Montesquieu 
suggested that the secret lay in the power of a number of ‘intermediary bodies’. 
We are told that ‘The single most important doctrine in The Spirit of the 
Laws is Montesquieu’s theory that intermediate bodies like the nobility, the 
parlements, the local courts of seigneurial justice, and the church are all 
indispensable to political liberty.’7 As Sorel summarizes Montesquieu’s thought,  
 
It is the nature of monarchy to be founded upon laws. The monarch is the source of all power, 
political and civil; but he exercises this power by means of channels ‘through which his power 
flows.’ These are ‘the intermediate, subordinate, and dependent powers,’  moderating ‘the 
shifting and capricious will of a single person.’ The two foremost of these powers are the 
nobility and clergy; the third is a body of magistrates, serving as a repository for constitutional 
laws, and reminding the prince of them when he seems to forget them. This hierarchy of rank 
is the necessary condition of monarchical government. If it is destroyed, the inevitable 
tendency is toward either despotism or democracy.8  
 
Thus the nobility administers justice, the Parlements interpret the laws.9 
 
   The tension between these is important, for each will be striving for 
supremacy. But it is essential that none should win completely. Their continued 
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rivalry and inability to become dominant lay behind English liberty. ‘The civil 
power being in the hands of an infinite number of lords, it was an easy matter for 
the ecclesiastic jurisdiction to gain daily a greater extent. But as the ecclesiastic 
courts weakened those of the lords, and contributed thereby to give strength to 
the royal jurisdiction, the latter gradually checked the jurisdiction of the clergy.’1 
 
   It was like the game of scissors, paper, stone. The clergy checked the lords, the 
Crown checked the clergy and, presumably, the lords checked the Crown. At a 
lower level, Montesquieu wrote at length about the need for intermediary 
bodies, the power of middling level entities such as city corporations, 
universities, guilds and fraternities. A strong development of such special groups 
would prevent that despotic division between a single ruler and his court on the 
one hand, and an enslaved populace on the other, which characterized China 
and had begun to emerge in Louis XIV’s France with the collapse of the 
provincial and national Parlements and other intermediary bodies. It was 
essential that there be many centres of power, each balancing the other. 
 
   It was for this reason that Montesquieu argued that far from showing the 
imminent collapse of the system, lively confrontations and arguments were a 
sign of health in a republic. A sustained harmony and peace was the sign of 
actual or imminent despotism. He showed ‘that pluralism and its perpetual 
tensions and quarrels are the fundamental and necessary conditions of political 
freedom.’2 His classic account of this is in relation to Rome. ‘We hear in the 
authors only of the dissensions that ruined Rome, without seeing that these 
dissensions were necessary to it, that they had always been there and always had 
to be... To ask for men in a free state who are bold in war and timid in peace is to 
wish the impossible. And, as a general rule, whenever we see everyone tranquil 
in a state that calls itself a republic, we can be sure that liberty does not exist 
there.’3  
 
   He then develops the idea of a productive tension, a harmony created through 
dissonance, a balanced and dynamic equilibrium of forces.  
 
What is called union in a body politic is a very equivocal thing. The true kind is a union of 
harmony, whereby all the parts, however opposed they may appear, cooperate for the general 
good of society - as dissonances in music cooperate in producing overall concord. In a state 
where we seem to see nothing but commotion there can be union - that is, a harmony 
resulting in happiness, which alone is true peace. It is as with the parts of the universe, 
eternally linked together by the action of some and the reaction of others.4  
 
By a kind of paradox, the apparent harmony of despotic societies, was actually 
much more deeply riven by conflict, though the surface was smooth. For, ‘in the 
concord of Asiatic despotism - that is, of all government which is not moderate - 
there is always real dissension. The worker, the soldier, the lawyer, the 
magistrate, the noble are joined only inasmuch as some oppress the others 
without resistance. And, if we see any union there, it is not citizens who are 
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united but dead bodies buried one next to the other.’1 Balanced polities were 
vibrant, energetic, noisy, alive; despotism was united by death - a powerful 
image. 
 
   All of this linked back to his earlier discussions. In theory a virtuous circle was 
possible. Liberty would encourage trade and manufacture, which would 
encourage the growth of powerful intermediate power groups, such as those 
represented in the English House of Commons, which would further establish 
liberty. Yet Montesquieu was in fact extremely dubious about the sustainability 
of this circle. The history of the world up to his time showed, as he said, that 
commercial republics were short-lived. Those of Italy and Germany had 
collapsed. As he wrote 
 
Commercial powers can continue in a state of mediocrity a long time, but their greatness is of 
short duration. They rise little by little, without anyone noticing, for they engage in no 
particular action that resounds and signals their power. But when things have come to the 
point where people cannot help but see what has happened, everyone seeks to deprive this 
nation of an advantage it has obtained, so to speak, only by surprise.2  
 
It seemed unlikely that Holland or England could long continue to tread the 
tight-rope between success and failure, for every success carried in it the 
temptation to expand and such expansion would, in the end, lead to collapse.  
 
   All that  Montesquieu could do was marvel at a current situation where, for a 
time, a reasonable sized power seemed to have got the  balance right. Thus the 
English ‘which liberty and laws render easy, on being freed from pernicious 
prejudices, has become a trading people.’3 And this trading tied in and 
reinforced the liberty and the religious independence. So that the English ‘know 
better than any other people upon earth how to value, at the same time, these 
three great advantages - religion, commerce, and liberty.’4  
 
 * 
 
   Montesquieu’s studies of the rise and collapse of Roman civilization and in 
particular his reading of Caesar and Tacitus on the customs of the Germanic 
peoples who conquered Rome, suggested an interesting theory to supplement 
his geographical reasons for the peculiarities of western Europe. In a sense these 
theories do not replace the earlier arguments. They tend to occur towards the 
middle and end of Spirit and are an attempt to provide an historical way of 
looking at the oddness of western Europe. 
 
   His basic premise was that in simple tribal societies there were those very 
values of liberty, equality and fraternity which characterized the best of current 
nations. Like Rousseau after him, Montesquieu believed that men were, by 
nature, born free and equal. The simplest people, hunter-gatherers, ‘enjoy great 
liberty; for as they do not cultivate the earth, they are not fixed: they are 
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wanderers and vagabonds; and if a chief should deprive them of their liberty, 
they would immediately go and seek it under another, or retire into the woods, 
and there live with their families.’1 Thus slavery was immoral, for ‘as all men are 
born equal, slavery must be accounted unnatural, though in some countries it be 
founded on natural reason.’2 The problem was that what began naturally and 
could be protected by voting with one’s feet, fleeing repression, later had to be 
protected by artificial means. ‘In the state of nature, indeed, all men are born 
equal, but they cannot continue in this equality. Society makes them lose it, and 
they recover it only by the protection of the laws.’3 This, in a nutshell, was the 
story which he wished to tell in relation to what had happened in western 
Europe. 
 
   Montesquieu’s reading of Caesar and Tacitus suggested to him that the early 
Germanic societies were largely pastoralists, mixing this  with hunting and 
gathering. ‘Caesar says, that “The Germans neglected agriculture; that the 
greatest part of them lived upon milk, cheese, and flesh; that no one had lands or 
boundaries of his own; that the princes and magistrates of each nation allotted 
what portion of land they pleased to individuals, and obliged them the year 
following to remove to some other part.”‘4 Or again, ‘It seems by Caesar and 
Tacitus that they applied themselves greatly to a pastoral life; hence the regula-
tions of the codes of barbarian laws almost all relate to their flocks.’5 Like many 
pastoral peoples, they were egalitarian and independent minded, both at the 
tribal and individual level. They enjoyed a sort of republican structure, a 
confederation of small chiefdoms with little hierarchy. ‘Each tribe apart was free 
and independent; and when they came to be intermixed, the independency still 
continued; the country was common, the government peculiar; the territory the 
same, and the nations different.’6 Thus they managed to share a territory 
without becoming locked into an increasingly oppressive state.  
 
   They were unusually isolated and rural peoples, as befitted their agriculture, 
and ruled themselves through a kind of universal suffrage. ‘The German nations 
that conquered the Roman Empire were certainly a free people. Of this we may 
be convinced only by reading Tacitus “On the Manners of the Germans”. The 
conquerors spread themselves over all the country; living mostly in the fields, 
and very little in the towns. When they were in Germany, the whole nation was 
able to assemble.’7 Any sign of instituted rulers at this time is a mistake. Just as 
monarchy was absent in much of Europe before the Roman conquests, so ‘the 
peoples of the north and of Germany were not less free; and if traces of kingly 
government are found among them, it is because the chiefs of armies or 
republics have been mistaken for monarchs.’8 
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   Another odd feature of these early societies was their monetary values in the 
midst of a pastoral economy. ‘The laws of the Germans constituted money a 
satisfaction for the injuries that were committed, and for the sufferings due to 
guilt. But as there was but very little specie in the country, they again constituted 
this money to be paid in goods or chattels.’1 Curiously for so warlike a peoples, 
‘Our ancestors, the Germans, admitted of none but pecuniary punishments. 
Those free and warlike people were of opinion that their blood ought not to be 
spilled but with sword in hand.’2 Thus, having very little cash, everything 
became interchangeable. ‘With these people money became cattle, goods, and 
merchandise, and these again became money.’3  
 
   Montesquieu’s view of the liberating effect of what happened, especially when 
compared to the effects of the conquests by the Mongols, is summarized as 
follows.  
 
Meantime an immense number of unknown races came out of the north, and poured like 
torrents into the Roman provinces: finding it as easy to conquer as to rob, they dismembered 
the empire, and founded kingdoms. These peoples were free, and they put such restrictions on 
the authority of their kings, that they were properly only chiefs or generals. Thus these 
kingdoms, although founded by force never endured the yoke of the conqueror. When the 
peoples of Asia, such as the Turks and the Tartars, made conquests, being subject to the will of 
one person, they thought only of providing him with new subjects, and of establishing by force 
of arms his reign of might; but the peoples of the north, free in their own countries, having 
seized the Roman provinces, did not give their chiefs much power. Some of these races, 
indeed, like the Vandals in Africa and the Goths in Spain, deposed their kings when they 
ceased to please them; and, amongst others, the power of the prince was limited in a thousand 
different ways; a great number of lords partook it with him; a war was never undertaken 
without their consent; the spoils were divided between the chief and the soldiers; and the laws 
were made in national assemblies. Here you have the fundamental principle of all those states 
which were formed from the ruins of the Roman Empire.4  
 
   The first wave of Germanic conquest was later re-enforced by a second with the 
Vikings. For these Montesquieu has equal praise. He wrote that Scandinavia 
‘was the source of the liberties of Europe - that is, of almost all the freedom 
which at present subsists amongst mankind.’5 Thus, perhaps oddly to us today 
when we have forgotten that the word French comes from ‘Franks’, Montesquieu 
stressed the Germanic roots of not just much of Europe, but in particular France. 
He wrote that ‘Our ancestors, the ancient Germans, lived in a climate where the 
passions were extremely calm.’6 He believed that ‘it is impossible to gain any 
insight into our political law unless we are thoroughly acquainted with the laws 
and manners of the German nations...’7 
 
  The spread of Germanic civilization helped Montesquieu explain a mystery, 
that is the uniform and unprecedented spread of an original and new form of 
civilization in western Europe which grew from the ashes of Roman civilization. 
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‘I should think my work imperfect were I to pass over in silence an event which 
never again, perhaps, will happen; were I not to speak of those laws which 
suddenly appeared over all Europe without being connected with any of the 
former institutions.’1 In fact, of course, although these laws bore little connection 
to the Roman civilization which he had studied so closely, they emanated 
directly from that system described for the Germans by Caesar and Tacitus for 
‘Such is the origin of the Gothic government amongst us.’2 This is the system 
which he admired and whose roots he wished to discover, for they clearly did not 
lie in Rome. ‘The feudal laws form a very beautiful prospect. A venerable old oak 
raises its lofty head to the skies, the eye sees from afar its spreading leaves; upon 
drawing nearer, it perceives the trunk but does not discern the root; the ground 
must be dug up to discover it.’3  
 
   The discovery of the roots was not merely of antiquarian interest for 
Montesquieu believed that the quintessence of liberty in modern Europe, that is 
the separation and balance of powers, had been first expressed in them. And it is 
therefore not surprising that he should make a great leap across the centuries by 
joining what he saw in the constitutional balance of early eighteenth century 
England to what he had read in Tacitus. ‘In perusing the admirable treatise of 
Tacitus “On the Manners of the Germans”, we find it is from that nation the 
English have borrowed the idea of their political government. This beautiful 
system was invented first in the woods.’4 It is not clear from this whether 
Montesquieu saw a straight continuity, or a conscious re-invention in England. 
He had neither the sources nor the time to fill in the detail of what happened 
over the intervening one and a half millenia. This will be a task taken up, as we 
shall see, by Tocqueville and Maitland. What is important is to note that 
Montesquieu’s theory gives him not only a stick to beat contemporary 
absolutisms in Europe with, but an hypothesis to explain the differences within 
Europe. 
 
   Drawing on hints in Montesquieu’s work, his theory can be put as follows. 
After the collapse of Rome, much of Europe was covered by a low density 
Germanic civilization, with its freedom and equality. Then over much of 
continental Europe, hierarchy and despotism began to re-assert itself as a 
necessary consequence of growing wealth and military confrontation. An 
expression and re-enforcing of this move towards what Tocqueville would call 
‘caste’ and towards absolutism, was the re-introduction of Roman law and the 
Roman Catholic religion. In essence Europe lost its freedoms to a resurgent 
Roman civilization - and this was most evident in southern and central Europe, 
for instance in France. For reasons which Montesquieu does not elaborate, this 
returning tide became weaker the further north one went. So England, an island 
in fact and in law, retained its basically Germanic social structure, political 
system and monetary values. Thus, with its Germanic Protestantism added to 
this, it seemed an oasis (with Holland) in a desert of threatened despotism. 
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   Montesquieu had seen the process occur in his studies of  Rome; the 
movement from small, egalitarian, societies, through increasing centralization of 
power, finally to absolutism and despotism. And he believed he discerned the 
same process in his own France. He writes of a visit to a library where the 
histories of all the modern nations are laid out.  
 
Here are the historians of France, who show us to begin with the power of kings taking shape; 
then we see it perish twice, and reappear only to languish through many ages; but, insensibly 
gathering strength and built up on all sides, it achieves it final stage: like those rivers which in 
their course lose their waters, or hide them under the earth; then reappearing again, swollen 
by the streams which flow into them, rapidly draw along with them all that opposes their 
passage.1 
 
It culminated in the near absolutism of Louis XIV when almost all the 
intermediary, counter-vailing, forces were crushed. In particular, the regional 
parliaments had withered. 
 
Parliaments are like those ruins which are trampled under foot, but which always recall the 
idea of some temple famous on account of the ancient religion of the people. They hardly 
interfere now except in matters of law; and their authority will continue to decrease unless 
some unforeseen event restores them to life and strength. The common fate has overtaken 
these great bodies; they have yielded to time which destroys everything, to moral corruption 
which weakens everything, and to absolute power which overbears everything.2 
 
   What was particularly sad, Montesquieu thought, was that the ancient 
foundations of freedom in Germanic laws and customs had been lost, and been 
overlain by the revived, absolutist and imperial, Roman laws. This Roman 
triumph had been made complete by Roman religion which had joined with 
Roman law. Speaking of France, Montesquieu asked: 
 
Who would imagine that the most ancient and powerful kingdom in Europe had been 
governed for ten centuries by laws which were not made for it? If the French had been 
conquered, it would not be difficult to understand, but they are the conquerors. They have 
abandoned the old laws made by their first kings in the general assemblies of the nations; and, 
singularly enough, the Roman laws which have been substituted, were partly made and partly 
digested by emperors contemporary with their own legislators. And, to make the borrowing 
complete, and in order that all their wisdom might come from others, they have adopted all 
the constitutions of the Popes, and have made them a new part of their law: a new kind of 
slavery.3 
 
   Montesquieu’s historical work was undertaken over two centuries ago. We may 
wonder how far it stands the test of time, and how far it has been refuted by 
subsequent research. Here we are fortunate to have a detailed study by Iris Cox 
on ‘Montesquieu and the history of French laws’ which compares his work in 
great detail with that of more recent scholars. She summarizes her findings thus: 
‘in my judgement, Montesquieu’s historical account stands up well in the light of 
modern knowledge. His account is comparatively short, but his statements on 
most of the points he regarded as important in connection with his theory about 
the spirit of the laws of France are supported in the works to which I have 
                                                
    1Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no.136 
    2Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no.93 
    3Montesquieu, Persian Letters, no. 101 
 51 
 
 
 
referred.’1 She lists all his major sections, from the ‘organization of early German 
society, the facts of the Frankish invasion of Gaul’ through to ‘the gradual 
re-emergence of Roman law in a different form’, and finds that ‘all these stages 
in Montesquieu’s outline of development may be found in the pages of Chenon, 
Lot and other modern historians.’2 She finds only two matters on which he may 
be mistaken and which affect his story: ‘One is the question as to whether people 
were free, in Merovingian and Carolingian times, to choose under which law 
they would live’, the other is ‘whether, from Merovingian times onwards, the 
administration of justice was ordinarily attached to the grant of land’.3 Neither 
of these possible areas of misinterpretation affect the more general account 
which I have summarized.    
 
 * 
 
When Montesquieu died his close friend the Earl of Chesterfield wrote the 
following tribute to him. 
 
 His virtues did honour to human nature; his writings justice. A friend to mankind, he 
asserted their undoubted and inalienable rights with freedom, even in his own country, whose 
prejudices in matters of religion and government he had long lamented, and endeavoured, not 
without some success, to remove. He well knew and justly admired the happy constitution of 
this country, where fixed and known laws equally restrain monarchy from tyranny, and liberty 
from licentiousness. His works will illustrate his name and survive him as long as right 
reason, moral obligation, and the true spirit of laws shall be understood, respected, and 
maintained.4  
 
   A century and a half later his French biographer, the historian Sorel, wrote a 
similar appraisal:  
 
We have had sublimer philosophers, bolder thinkers, more eloquent writers, sadder, more 
pathetic, and more fertile creators of fictitious characters, and authors richer in the invention 
of images. We have had no more judicious observer of human societies, no wiser counsellor 
regarding great public interests, no man who had united so acute a perception of individual 
passions with such profound penetration into political institutions, - no one, in short, who has 
employed such rare literary talent in the service of such perfect good-sense.5 
 
   These descriptions praise Montesquieu’s mixture of high intelligence and 
courage. He managed to speak out against cruelty, slavery and absolutism 
despite the dangers. More importantly, he kept his regard for liberty, his 
freedom of spirit, alive despite the pressures of the French State and the 
Inquisition. One way to explain his achievement is to take the final message of 
his Lettres Persanes. Throughout the book the absolutist Usbek has been 
trying to break the spirit of the women in the harem. He believes he has at least 
achieved this in the case of his favourite Roxanne, whom he had raped into 
submission. Then, in the last letter she writes to him as she dies from 
self-poisoning, she exults that all his oppression has failed. In the midst of 
tyranny, watched and guarded and punished, she has kept her spirit and soul 
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free. We can hear Montesquieu’s voice in hers, as he writes to the absolutist 
forces of his time. ‘How could you think that I was such a weakling as to imagine 
there was nothing for me in the world but to worship your caprices; that while 
you indulged all your desires, you should have the right to thwart me in all 
mine? No: I have lived in slavery, and yet always retained my freedom: I have 
remodelled your laws upon those of nature; and my mind has always maintained 
its independence.’1 Thus it is absolutism which collapses, not the individual 
conscience. ‘For a long time you have had the satisfaction of believing that you 
had conquered a heart like mine: now we are both delighted: you thought me 
deceived, and I have deceived you.’2  
 
   Through his integrity and support for liberty Montesquieu provided a model 
which would later inspire the two greatest revolutionary movements towards 
liberty of modern times. He was constantly cited and quoted by the  figures in 
both the American and French revolutions and Jefferson’s declaration of 
independence and the rights of man was based on his inspiration.  
 
   What, then, has this dialogue with Montesquieu contributed to an answer to 
the two riddles posed at the start of this book, namely why what were the forces 
which have made the development of human civilizations so slow and painful, 
and then what  has enabled the ‘progress’ of mankind to be so amazingly rapid 
during the last three hundred years? In terms of approach, his elaboration of a 
comparative, structural and ‘ideal type’ methodology strengthens the case for 
believing that these are a fruitful way to approach the problem. He also provides 
a detailed historical account.  
 
   In terms of theory, there are a number of important contributions; the 
difficulties and precariousness of liberty, the relations of spheres and the 
tendency towards a rigid overlap of domains, yet the necessity of separation, 
political pluralism and liberty in order to create a virtuous spiral. Other 
important ideas include : the dangers associated with being conquered, islands 
and liberty and the importance of the size of political units on the likelihood of 
despotism. Above all, he lays out a preliminary historical account of how the 
escape may have happened. He shows the natural tendency of the rise and then 
destruction of centres of freedom, but he then shows through his examination of 
European history how England just managed to avoid this tendency. He 
appreciates the crucial role and nature of feudalism and shows how everywhere 
(except England) feudalism degenerated into caste and absolutism. He also 
considers the important case of China.  
 
   Among other useful ideas are those concerning the temptations to conquest 
which ruined the Roman Empire, the importance of Protestant Christianity as a 
religion of liberty, the importance of climate and the surprising advantages of 
having poor natural resources, and the advantages of ecological and 
geographical diversity in encouraging trade. He also noted the beneficial effects 
of commerce on ‘morals’, the enormous effects of rice cultivation on population 
and social structure, the devastating effects of the Mongol invasions, the dangers 
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of over-taxation, and the ways in which liberty in turn, at least for a while,  leads 
to wealth. 
 
   Finally there is his analysis of the system of checks and balances, of the role of 
Common Law and parliament, and of secondary powers, and in the maintenance 
of liberty once it had been achieved. Ultimately Montesquieu saw the solution to 
the riddle in the accidental emergence of a balance of powers between lords, 
clergy ruler and people, always fragile but somehow long maintained in 
England.  
 
   With Montesquieu we have a first approximation to an answer. Not only do we 
know how an answer might be constructed, but large parts, particularly on the 
geographical and historical side, have been partially filled in. Yet a partially 
completed answer is even more tantalizing and beckons us on to our next 
encounter with one of Montesquieu’s greatest disciples, Adam Smith.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 See the separate volume on Adam Smith in this series. 
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